The plan of the upcoming offensive of the Nazi troops. Third-party materials: "The German offensive and the prerequisites for a radical change

In mid-July 1941, the situation at the front for the Soviet Army continued to be unfavorable. The fighting took place 120 km from Leningrad, in the Smolensk region and on the outskirts of Kiev. The enemy has created an immediate threat of the capture of these large administrative centers. Only in the north (Arctic and Karelia) and in the south (Moldova) the advance of the Nazi troops was insignificant.

The Soviet troops suffered serious losses, needed to be reorganized and replenished with people and weapons. In the meantime, it was becoming obvious that the industry, due to the beginning of the relocation of many enterprises from threatened areas, would not be able to satisfy the growing needs of the Armed Forces in the near future.

As part of the Soviet army in mid-July, there were 212 divisions and 3 rifle brigades ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 33, l. 82a.). Of these, only 90 were fully staffed.

The lack of military equipment and weapons, the formation of many reserve units and formations, as well as the highly maneuverable nature of military operations, made the Soviet command face the need to make major changes in the organizational structure of the troops.

On July 15, the Headquarters, in a directive letter to the commanders-in-chief of the troops of strategic directions, commanders of fronts, armies and military districts, pointed out the need, at the first opportunity, gradually, without prejudice to current operations, to prepare a transition to a system of small armies "of five to a maximum of six divisions without corps directorates and with direct subordination of divisions to the commander of the army "( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 77, l. 59.). The same letter outlined the decision to disband the mechanized corps and change the regular structure of rifle, cavalry and aviation formations and units.

According to the staff approved on July 29, the size of the rifle division was reduced by 30 percent, the number of artillery weapons in it - by 52 percent, vehicles - by 64 percent. The combat capabilities of a rifle division in terms of firepower and maneuverability were greatly reduced. Compared to the German infantry division, it now had 1.5 times less people, 1.4 times less small arms, 2.1 times less guns and mortars ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 5. ll. 242, 243, 704.). In fact, there were even fewer personnel and weapons in the rifle division.

The situation with tank, cavalry and aviation formations and artillery units was no better.

Mechanized corps, in order to restore and maintain their combat capability, required a large number of tanks, and the industry could not yet provide them. Therefore, these corps were disbanded. The lack of armored vehicles did not allow the preservation of individual tank divisions.

The brigade became the main tactical formation of the armored forces, and the cavalry - a division of about 3 thousand people. In aviation, three-regiment air divisions were replaced by two-regiment ones with a decrease in the number of aircraft in the regiments from 60 to 30, and then to 22.

Artillery also underwent serious organizational changes. The understaffing of the materiel of anti-tank artillery forced the brigades to be disbanded and instead of them, regiments of five-battery and then four-battery composition, 16 guns each, were created. Cannon and howitzer regiments of the reserve of the High Command (RGK) were transferred to reduced staffing. In this regard, their fire capabilities decreased by 2 times.

The forced transition to the formation of units and formations with a reduced number of weapons, almost without mechanized vehicles, sharply reduced their combat power and maneuverability.

The lack of weapons and the resulting reorganization of the troops forced commanders of all levels to look for appropriate tactical methods of conducting combat operations, new forms and methods of using military branches and various kinds weapons. Thus, for the more expedient and centralized use of the limited aviation forces, reserve aviation groups began to be created in August, subordinate to the Supreme High Command. They decided combat missions independently or were involved to strengthen the air forces of the fronts. In order to more effectively use artillery in combat and operations, the assignment of tasks to artillery units and responsibility for their implementation were assigned to artillery commanders, who were appointed deputies of combined arms commanders and commanders.

The reorganization of troops at the tactical and operational levels in accordance with the requirements of the directive letter from the Headquarters did not take place as a one-act event. In contrast to the restructuring of the highest military command and control bodies and the central apparatus, carried out in a relatively short time, it continued almost until the end of 1941.

In connection with the increased need for command personnel, the system of their training has changed significantly. The work of military schools was completely restructured. At military academies, schools, headquarters of the fronts and armies, a wide network of short-term courses was deployed. The system of training junior officers of the Soviet Army was expanded.

The need to make up for combat losses, recruiting a large number of new military formations for the front and creating reserves required the call-up of additional contingents of Soviet citizens. In August, the mobilization of those liable for military service in 1890-1904 was announced. and conscripts born before 1923. The size of the Armed Forces has also increased due to the creation militia which was a special expression of patriotism Soviet people- a manifestation of a sense of high civic responsibility for the fate of the Motherland.

Despite the deep advance within the country, the Nazis in the initial period of the war, faced with the increasing day by day resistance of the Soviet troops, could not defeat the main forces of the Soviet Army in the western regions of the USSR, that is, solve the immediate task of the Barbarossa plan.

By mid-July, the enemy had 182 divisions on the Soviet-German front. Fourteen divisions were in the reserve of the high command of the German ground forces.

The fascist troops continued to carry out the tasks assigned to them in the directive on strategic concentration and deployment. The closest of them were: for the German army group "North" and the Finnish armies - the capture of Leningrad, for the army group "Center" - the defeat of Soviet troops in the Smolensk-Moscow direction and for the army group "South" - the capture of Kiev and the encirclement of Soviet troops on Pravoberezhnaya Ukraine. At the same time, Army Group Center was supposed to surround the armies of the Western Front with bilateral coverage and, having broken their "last organized resistance ... open their way to Moscow" ( F. Halder. Military diary, vol. 3, book. 1, page 101.).

Advancing with the main forces of Army Group Center on Moscow, the Nazis hoped, after mastering the interfluve of the Western Dvina and Dnieper, to send its mobile troops - the 3rd Panzer Group of General G. Goth - to help Army Group North or to the east to strike at Moscow , and the 2nd tank group of General G. Guderian - in the south or southeast direction to support the offensive of Army Group South.

The Finnish armies, which went on the offensive on July 10, were to advance on both sides of Lake Ladoga and assist the German troops in capturing Leningrad. At the same time, they were entrusted with the task of capturing Soviet Karelia.

The Soviet command, in order to prevent the further advance of the enemy inland, continued to take measures to stabilize the front and strengthen the army in the field. Having timely determined that the western direction was the decisive one, where the enemy was rushing through Smolensk to Moscow, it sent up to 80 percent of all troops advanced from the depths of the country there. Most of them, who arrived in the first half of July, were already fighting in the beginning of the battle of Smolensk.

By order of the Stavka dated July 14, 1941, to ensure the junction between the troops of the North-Western and Western directions from Staraya Russa to Olenino, the 29th and 30th armies were deployed, consisting of 10 divisions, and to the east - in the areas of Torzhok, Rzhev, Volokolamsk, Kalinin, Ruza, Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets, Naro-Fominsk, the formation of the 31st and 32nd armies was ending. Together with the troops of the previously advanced 24th and 28th armies, they united in the front of the reserve armies with the task of "occupying the line of Staraya Russa, Ostashkov, Bely, Istomino, Yelnya, Bryansk and prepare for a stubborn defense" ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 77, ll. 55-57.). Here, to the east of the main defensive line, which ran along the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers and had already been broken through by the enemy, a second line of defense was being created.

On July 18, the Headquarters decided to deploy another front on the distant approaches to Moscow - the front of the Mozhaisk line of defense under the command of General P. A. Artemyev. It included three armies, formed from divisions of the border and internal troops NKVD and the Moscow people's militia (33rd, 34th) and from the front of the reserve armies (32nd). The front received the task of preparing and defending the line west of the Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk, Kaluga line ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 77, ll. 65-66.).

Similar activities, although on a smaller scale, were carried out in the North-West and South-West strategic directions.

During strategic defense The Soviet Army had to wear down the enemy's shock groupings, stop their advance and prepare for offensive operations. Soviet soldiers were determined to fulfill the order of the Motherland. The military councils of the fronts, armies, fleets and flotillas, commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations launched a great deal of work to improve the moral and political training of soldiers, their psychological stability and perseverance on the defensive. The advanced experience of troop combat activity was widely promoted and introduced into the practice of units and formations. Tank destroyer detachments were created from the most courageous and experienced fighters, commanders and political workers, 40-60 percent of the personnel of these detachments were communists and Komsomol members ( MO archive, f. 208, op. 2526, d. 46, l. 204.). In party-political work, much attention was paid to familiarizing the new arrivals in the part of the replenishment with heroic deeds. Soviet soldiers, with the nature of the enemy's actions, with his tactics, characteristic methods of using tanks, aircraft, automatic weapons; mobilization of young fighters for the fastest mastery of the most effective methods of fighting the enemy, strict implementation of the order of the Headquarters of July 14, 1941 on the preservation of weapons.

The Communist Party, using a variety of forms and methods of political work in the army and navy, strengthened the faith in soldiers and commanders in victory, in their ability to defeat the enemy. Military councils, commanders, commissars and political agencies explained to the personnel the just nature of the Patriotic War, exposed fascism, the aggressive aspirations of the aggressor and instilled in the soldiers hatred for him, readiness to overcome all difficulties in the name of victory. The educational work was based on the requirements of the GKO resolution of July 16, the order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of August 16 and the directives of the main political departments of the Soviet Army and Navy to strengthen discipline in the troops ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 5456, ll. 1-2; MO archive, f. 32, op. 795436, d. 1, ll. 191 - 192; op. 920265, d. 3, l. 200.). At party and Komsomol meetings of subdivisions and units, meetings of the party activists of formations, at meetings of the commanding staff, specific measures were discussed and outlined to ensure the vanguard role of communists and Komsomol members in the performance of combat missions, strengthening order, and fighting cowards and alarmists. These decisions were persistently implemented. On the pages military seal regularly published materials on loyalty to military duty and Soviet Motherland, the requirements of the military oath and military regulations were explained.

Due to the fact that individual commanders and political workers replaced political and educational work with administration, the People's Commissar of Defense issued an order on October 4 in which he demanded a radical improvement in the education of soldiers, the strengthening of discipline by methods of persuasion, and the full deployment of agitation and propaganda work. Measures were taken to improve the training of propagandists, to replenish the ranks of agitators with experienced, politically literate soldiers.

The ranks of the army and navy communists were replenished through general civil and party mobilizations and the admission of the best fighters and commanders to the party. In accordance with the resolutions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 27 and 29, 1941, eight party mobilizations were carried out in the first 2.5 months of the war, as a result of which the army and navy received about 94 thousand political fighters (60 percent of the communists and 40 percent Komsomol members). 58 thousand of them joined the active army, the rest were sent to newly formed units, to military courses and schools ( N. Kirsanov. Party mobilization to the front during the Great Patriotic War. M., 1972, pp. 39-41.). As the political department of the Western Front noted, the political fighters joined "in parts of the front in the most difficult moments of the fighting ... and were a great force in strengthening the stability of our troops" ( MO archive, f. 208, op. 2526, d. 25, ll. 282-283.).

In the active army, the influx of applications to party organizations for admission to the party increased. "We want to go into battle as communists," said many fighters and commanders.

By the end of 1941, compared with the beginning of the war, the ranks of communists in the active army more than doubled ( History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, vol. 5, book. 1, page 373.).

In mid-July, a new extremely difficult stage in the struggle of the Soviet Armed Forces to thwart Hitler's plans began. It lasted 2.5 months. During this period, the battles near Leningrad, in the regions of Smolensk, Kiev, Odessa, as well as in the Far North and in Karelia, were especially tense.

PLAN" BARBAROSSA ". In the evening December 18, 1940. Hitler signed a directive on the deployment of military operations against the USSR, which received serial number 21 and code name option " Barbarossa"(Fall" barbarossa"). It was made only in nine copies, three of which were handed over to the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the armed forces (ground forces, air force and navy), and six were closed in OKW safes.

It stated only the general plan and initial instructions for waging war against the USSR and did not represent a complete war plan. The plan of war against the USSR is whole complex political, economic and strategic measures of the Hitlerite leadership. In addition to directive N21, the plan included directives and orders of the supreme command and the main commands of the branches of the armed forces on strategic concentration and deployment, logistics, preparation of the theater of operations, camouflage, disinformation and other documents.. Among these documents, the directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of ground forces was especially important. dated January 31, 1941. It concretized and specified the tasks and methods of action of the armed forces set out in Directive N21.
plan" Barbarossa"the defeat of the Soviet Union was envisaged in the course of one short-term campaign even before the war against England was over. Leningrad, Moscow, the Central Industrial Region and the Donets Basin were recognized as the main strategic objects. A special place in the plan was given to Moscow. It was assumed that its capture would be decisive for the victorious outcome of the entire war. " The end goal of the operation, - stated in directive N21, - is the creation of a protective barrier against Asiatic Russia along the Volga-Arkhangelsk common line. Thus, if necessary, the last industrial region left by the Russians in the Urals can be paralyzed with the help of aviation". To defeat the Soviet Union, it was planned to use all the ground forces of Germany, excluding only the formations and units necessary for the occupation service in the enslaved countries. The German Air Force was tasked with "release such forces to support the ground forces during the eastern campaign, so that you can count on the rapid completion of ground operations and at the same time limit to a minimum the destruction of the eastern regions of Germany by enemy aircraft. "For combat operations at sea against the three Soviet fleets of the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea, it was planned to allocate a significant part of the warships of the German Navy and the naval forces of Finland and Romania .according to plan" Barbarossa"152 divisions (including 19 tank and 14 motorized) and two brigades were allocated to attack the USSR. Germany's allies fielded 29 infantry divisions and 16 brigades. Thus, if we take two brigades for one division, a total of 190 divisions were allocated. In addition , two-thirds of the air force available in Germany and significant fleet forces were involved in the war against the USSR. Soviet Union, were reduced to three army groups: " South"- 11th, 17th and 6th field armies and 1st tank group;" Centre"- 4th and 9th field armies, 2nd and 3rd tank groups;" North"- the 16th and 18th and 4th tank groups. The 2nd separate field army remained in the OKH reserve, the army" Norway"received the task of acting independently in the Murmansk and Kandalash directions.
Plan" Barbarossa"contained a somewhat refined assessment of the Armed Forces of the USSR. According to German data, by the beginning of the German invasion (June 20, 1941), the Soviet Armed Forces had 170 rifle, 33.5 cavalry divisions and 46 mechanized and tank brigades. Of these, as stated by the Nazi command, 118 rifle, 20 cavalry divisions and 40 brigades were deployed in the western border districts, 27 rifle, 5.5 cavalry divisions and 1 brigade in the rest of the European part of the USSR, and 33 divisions and 5 brigades in Far East. It was assumed that Soviet aviation had 8,000 combat aircraft (including about 1,100 modern ones), of which 6,000 were in the European part of the USSR. Hitler's command assumed that Soviet troops deployed in the west, use field fortifications on the new and old state borders for defense, as well as numerous water barriers, will engage in battle in large formations west of the Dnieper and Zapadnaya Dvina rivers. At the same time, the Soviet command will strive to keep air and naval bases in the Baltic, and rely on the Black Sea coast with the southern wing of the front. " With the unfavorable development of operations south and north of the Pripyat swamps, - noted in the plan " Barbarossa ", - the Russians will try to stop the German offensive on the line of the Dnieper, Western Dvina rivers. When trying to liquidate German breakthroughs, as well as with possible attempts to withdraw the threatened troops beyond the line of the Dnieper, Western Dvina, one should reckon with the possibility of offensive operations from large Russian formations using tanks".






According to sir" Barbarossa"Large tank and motorized forces, using aviation support, were supposed to deliver a swift strike to a great depth north and south of the Pripyat marshes, break through the defenses of the main forces of the Soviet Army, presumably concentrated in the western part of the USSR, and destroy the scattered groupings of Soviet troops. North of the Pripyat marshes was planned offensive of two army groups: " Centre F. Bock) and " North"(Commander Field Marshal W. Leeb) . Army Group" Centre"delivered the main blow and had to, concentrating the main efforts on the flanks, where the 2nd and 3rd tank groups were deployed, to carry out a deep breakthrough by these formations north and south of Minsk, to reach the Smolensk area, scheduled for the connection of tank groups. It was assumed that with the release of tank formations in the Smolensk region, prerequisites will be created for the destruction of the field armies of the Soviet troops remaining between Bialystok and Minsk. Subsequently, upon reaching the Roslavl, Smolensk, Vitebsk line by the main forces, the army group " Centre"It was necessary to act depending on the situation developing on its left wing. If the neighbor on the left fails to quickly defeat the troops defending in front of him, the army group was supposed to turn tank formations to the north, and the field armies should lead the offensive in an easterly direction towards Moscow. If the group armies" North"will be able to carry out the defeat of the Soviet Army in its offensive zone, army group" Center"It was necessary to immediately strike at Moscow. Army Group" North"received the task, advancing from East Prussia, to deliver the main blow in the direction of Daugavpils, Leningrad, to destroy the troops of the Soviet Army defending in the Baltic States and, having captured the ports on the Baltic Sea, including Leningrad and Kronstadt, to deprive the Soviet Baltic Fleet of its bases. If this army group the defeat of the grouping of Soviet troops in the Baltic states would be beyond its power, the mobile troops of the army group should have come to its aid " Centre", the Finnish army and the formations transferred from Norway. Thus strengthened by the army group" North"It was necessary to achieve the destruction of the Soviet troops opposing it. According to the plan of the German command, the operation of a reinforced army group" North"provided to the army group" Centre"freedom of maneuver to capture Moscow and the solution of operational and strategic tasks in cooperation with the army group" South".
South of the Pripyat swamps army group planned to attack South"(Commander General Field Marshal G. Rundstedt ) . She delivered one strong blow from the Lublin region in the general direction to Kiev and further south along the bend of the Dnieper. As a result of a blow in which leading role powerful tank formations were supposed to play, it was supposed to cut off the Soviet troops stationed in Western Ukraine from their communications on the Dnieper, capture the crossings across the Dnieper in the Kiev region and south of it. In this way, it provided freedom of maneuver for developing an offensive in an easterly direction in cooperation with troops advancing north, or for an attack on the south of the Soviet Union in order to capture important economic regions. Troops of the right wing of the army group " South"(11th Army) were, creating a false impression of the deployment of large forces on the territory of Romania, to pin down the opposing troops of the Soviet Army, and in the future, as the offensive developed on the Soviet-German front, to prevent the organized withdrawal of Soviet formations beyond the Dniester.
In respect of " Barbarossa"it was planned to use the principles of military operations that had justified themselves in the Polish and Western European campaigns. However, it was emphasized that unlike operations in the West, an offensive against Soviet troops must be carried out simultaneously on the entire front: both in the direction of the main attacks and in secondary sectors. "Only this way, - stated in the directive of January 31, 1941, - it will be possible to prevent the timely withdrawal of enemy combat-ready forces and destroy them to the west of the Dnieper-Dvina line".






Plan" Barbarossa took into account the possibility of active opposition Soviet aviation advance of the German ground forces. From the very beginning of hostilities, the German Air Force was tasked with suppressing the Soviet Air Force and supporting the offensive of ground forces in the directions of the main strikes. To solve these problems, at the first stage of the war, it was envisaged to use almost all of the German aviation allocated for operations against the Soviet Union. Attacks on the rear industrial centers of the USSR were planned to begin only after the troops of the Soviet Army were defeated in Belarus, the Baltic states and Ukraine. Army Group Advance" Centre"it was planned to support the 2nd air fleet," South"- 4th Air Fleet," North- 1st Air Fleet.
Navy Nazi Germany was supposed to defend its coast and prevent the breakthrough of the ships of the Soviet Navy from the Baltic Sea. At the same time, it was envisaged to avoid major naval operations until the land forces captured Leningrad as the last naval base of the Soviet Baltic Fleet. Later, before naval forces Nazi Germany was tasked with ensuring freedom of navigation in the Baltic Sea and supplying the troops of the northern wing of the ground forces. The attack on the USSR was planned to be carried out on May 15, 1941.
So according to the plan Barbarossa" nearest The strategic goal of the Nazis in the war against the USSR was to defeat the troops of the Soviet Army in the Baltic States, Belarus and the Right-Bank Ukraine. The subsequent goal was to capture Leningrad in the north, in the center - the Central Industrial Region and the capital of the Soviet Union, in the south - to capture all of Ukraine and the Donets Basin as quickly as possible. The ultimate goal of the eastern campaign was the exit of the Nazi troops to the Volga and the Northern Dvina..
February 3, 1941. meeting in Berchtesgaden Hitler in the presence Keitel and Jodl heard a detailed report Brauchitsch and Hyder about the plan of war against the USSR. The Führer approved the report and assured the generals that the plan would be carried out successfully: " When the implementation of the Barbarossa plan begins, the world will hold its breath and freeze". The armed forces of Romania, Hungary and Finland - allies of Nazi Germany - were to receive specific tasks immediately before the start of the war. The use of the Romanian troops was determined by the plan " Munich", developed by the command of the German troops in Romania. In mid-June, this plan was brought to the attention of the Romanian leadership. June 20, Romanian dictator Antonescu gave on its basis an order to the armed forces of Romania, which outlined the tasks of the Romanian troops. Before the outbreak of hostilities, the Romanian ground forces were supposed to cover the concentration and deployment of German troops in Romania, and with the outbreak of the war, to tie down the grouping of Soviet troops located on the border with Romania. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the line of the Prut River, which, as was believed, would follow as a result of the offensive of the German army group " South", the Romanian troops had to move on to energetic pursuit of the units of the Soviet Army. If the Soviet troops managed to hold their positions along the Prut River, the Romanian formations had to break through the Soviet defenses in the Tsutsora, Novy Bedrazh sector. The tasks of the Finnish and German troops deployed in the North and Central Finland, were identified OKW directive of April 7, 1941. and announced by the operational directives of the Finnish General Staff, as well as the directive of the army commander " Norway"dated April 20. The OKW directive provided that the armed forces of Finland before the offensive of the Nazi troops were to cover the deployment of German formations in Finland, and with the transition of the Wehrmacht to the offensive, the Soviet groups in the Karelian and Petrozavodsk directions should be attacked. With the release of the army group " North"on the line of the Luga River, the Finnish troops were to launch a decisive offensive on Karelian Isthmus, as well as between the Onega and Ladoga lakes, in order to connect with the German armies on the Svir River and in the Leningrad region. The German troops deployed in Finland, according to the directive of the commander of the army "Norway", were tasked with advancing in two groups (each consisted of a reinforced corps): one - to Murmansk, the other - to Kandalaksha. The southern grouping, having broken through the defenses, was supposed to go to the White Sea in the Kandalakshiya region, then advance along the Murmansk railway to the north, in order, in cooperation with the northern grouping, to destroy the Soviet troops stationed on the Kola Peninsula and capture Murmansk and Polyarnoye. Aviation support Finnish and German troops advancing from Finland were assigned to the 5th Air Fleet of Germany and the Finnish Air Force.
At the end of April, the political and military leadership of fascist Germany finally set the date for the attack on the USSR: Sunday, June 22, 1941. The postponement from May to June was caused by the need to redeploy to the borders of the USSR the forces involved in the aggression against Yugoslavia and Greece.
In preparing for a war against the USSR, the Hitlerite leadership outlined major measures for the restructuring of its armed forces. They concerned primarily the ground forces. It was planned to bring the number of divisions of the active army to 180 and increase the reserve army. By the beginning of the war against the USSR, the Wehrmacht, including the reserve army and the SS troops, was supposed to have about 250 fully equipped divisions. Particular attention was paid to the strengthening of mobile troops. It was planned to deploy 20 tank divisions instead of the existing 10 and to increase the level of infantry motorization. To this end, it was planned to additionally allocate 130 thousand tons of steel for the production of military trucks, all-terrain vehicles and armored vehicles at the expense of the fleet and aviation. Big changes were planned in the production of weapons. According to the planned program the most important task was the release of the latest models of tanks and anti-tank artillery. A significant increase in the production of aircraft of those designs that withstood the test during the fighting in the West was also envisaged. Great importance was attached to the preparation of the theater of operations. Directive of 9 August 1940, which received the code name " Aufbau Ost" ("Construction in the East"), it was planned to transfer supply bases from west to east, build new railways and highways, training grounds, barracks, etc. in the eastern regions, expand and improve airfields, communication networks.
In preparations for aggression against the USSR, the Hitlerite leadership assigned the most important place to ensuring the surprise of the attack and the secrecy of carrying out each preparatory measure, whether it concerned the restructuring of the economy, strategic planning, the preparation of a theater of military operations or the deployment of armed forces, etc. All documents related to the planning of the war in the East were prepared with the utmost secrecy. An extremely narrow circle of people was allowed to develop them. The concentration and operational deployment of troops was planned to be carried out in compliance with all camouflage measures. However, the Nazi leadership understood that it was impossible to completely hide the concentration and deployment of a multimillion-strong army near the Soviet borders with huge amount military equipment. Therefore, it resorted to a widely conceived political and operational-strategic camouflage of the impending aggression, recognizing the number one task of misleading the government of the Soviet Union and the command of the Soviet Army about the plan, scale and time of the start of aggression.


Both the operational-strategic leadership bodies and the Abwehr (intelligence and counterintelligence) took part in the development of measures to disguise the concentration of Wehrmacht troops in the east. The Abwehr developed a directive signed on September 6, 1940 by Jodl, which specifically outlined the goals and objectives of disinformation. Directive N21 - version " Barbarossa". But perhaps most fully the perfidious tactics of the Nazis are revealed by the directive on disinformation of the enemy, issued by the OKW on February 15, 1941." The purpose of disinformation is, - indicated in the directive, -h to hide preparations for Operation Barbarossa". This the main objective and should form the basis of all measures to disinform the enemy". Camouflage measures were planned to be carried out in two stages. First stage- until about mid-April 1941 - included the camouflage of general military preparations not related to the mass regrouping of troops. Second- from April to June 1941 - masking the concentration and operational deployment of troops near the borders of the USSR. At the first stage, it was planned to create a false idea about the true intentions of the German command, using various kinds of preparations for the invasion of England, as well as for the operation " Marita" (against Greece) and " Sonnenblume"(in North Africa). The initial deployment of troops to attack the USSR was planned to be carried out under the guise of the usual movements for the army. At the same time, the tasks were to create the impression that the center of concentration of armed forces was located in southern Poland, in Czechoslovakia and Austria and that the concentration of troops in the north At the second stage, when, as noted in the directive, it would no longer be possible to hide the preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union, it was planned to present the concentration and deployment of forces for the eastern campaign in the form of false measures, allegedly carried out with the aim of diverting attention from the planned invasion of England This distracting maneuver was presented by the Hitlerite command as "the greatest in the history of wars. " At the same time, work was carried out aimed at preserving the impression among the personnel of the German armed forces that preparations for the landing in England were continuing, but in a different form - allocated for this purpose troops are withdrawn to the rear until a certain point . " Necessary, - the directive said, - keep as long as possible in error about the real plans even those troops intended to operate directly in the east". Importance was attached, in particular, to the dissemination of disinformation about non-existent airborne corps, allegedly intended to invade England. The forthcoming landing on the British Isles should have been evidenced by such facts as the seconding of translators to military units from in English, release of new English topographic maps, reference books, etc. Among the officers of the Army Group" South"Rumors spread that German troops would allegedly be transferred to Iran to wage a war to seize the British colonies. The OKW directive on disinformation of the enemy indicated that the more forces were concentrated in the east, the more efforts must be made to keep public opinion misled about the German plans. In the instructions of the Chief of Staff of the OKW of March 9, it was recommended to represent the deployment of the Wehrmacht in the east and as defensive measures to ensure the rear of Germany during the landings in England and operations in the Balkans.


The Hitler leadership was so confident in the successful implementation of the plan " Barbarossa", which, approximately from the spring of 1941, began the detailed development of further plans for the conquest of world domination. In the official diary of the Supreme High Command of the Nazi armed forces for February 17, 1941, Hitler's demand was stated that "after the end of the eastern campaign, it is necessary to provide for the capture of Afghanistan and the organization of an offensive against India"Based on these instructions, the OKW headquarters began planning Wehrmacht operations for the future. These operations were scheduled to be carried out in the late autumn of 1941 and in the winter of 1941/42. Their concept was set out in the draft directives N32 "Preparing for the post-Barbarossa period", sent to the ground forces, air force and navy on June 11, 1941. The project provided that after the defeat of the Soviet Armed Forces, the Wehrmacht would have to seize the British colonial possessions and some independent countries in the basin mediterranean sea , Africa, the Near and Middle East, the invasion of the British Isles, the deployment of military operations against America. G As early as the autumn of 1941, Hitler's strategists expected to begin conquering Iran, Iraq, Egypt, the Suez Canal region, and then India, where they planned to join the Japanese troops. The fascist German leadership hoped, by annexing Spain and Portugal to Germany, to quickly accept the siege of the islands.. The development of directive N32 and other documents indicates that after the defeat of the USSR and the decision " English problem"the Nazis intended to ally with Japan" eliminate the influence of the Anglo-Saxons in North America". Capture of Canada and the United States of America It was supposed to be carried out by landing large amphibious assaults from bases in Greenland, Iceland, the Azores and Brazil - on the east coast of North America and from the Aleutian and Hawaiian Islands - on the west. In April-June 1941, these questions were repeatedly discussed at the highest headquarters of the German armed forces. Thus, even before the aggression against the USSR, the German fascist leadership outlined far-reaching plans for the conquest of world domination. The key position for their implementation, as it seemed to the Nazi command, was given by a campaign against the USSR.
In contrast to the preparation of campaigns against Poland, France and the Balkan states, the war against the USSR was prepared by the Hitlerite command with special care and over a longer period of time. Aggression against the USSR according to the plan " Barbarossa"was planned as a fleeting campaign, the ultimate goal of which - the defeat of the Soviet Armed Forces and the destruction of the Soviet Union - was supposed to be achieved in the fall of 1941 .
The fighting of the armed forces was supposed to be carried out in the form of a blitzkrieg. At the same time, the offensive of the main strategic groupings was presented in the form of a continuous offensive at a fast pace. Short pauses were allowed only for the regrouping of troops and pulling up the lagging rear. The possibility of stopping the offensive due to the resistance of the Soviet Army was ruled out. Excessive confidence in the infallibility of their intentions and plans " hypnotized"fascist generals. Hitler's machine was gaining momentum to win victory, which seemed so easy and close to the leaders of the" Third Reich ".

After the defeat of the elite troops at Stalingrad, Hitler longed for revenge. The Kursk Bulge seemed to him the most suitable place for new Cannes. The configuration of the terrain in the form of a huge ledge, deepening two hundred kilometers to the west of the general front line, in the Kursk direction, seemed to contribute to this. At the beginning of April 1943, the fascist German command began to carefully prepare a strategic offensive operation under code name "Citadel" .

OPERATIONAL ORDER N 6

OKH, General Staff of the Ground Forces Operations Department (1) X. 430246/43

Printed in 13 copies.

"Sov. secret.

For command only.

Transmit only through an officer I have decided, as soon as weather conditions permit, to launch the Citadel Offensive, the first offensive of the year. This offensive is of decisive importance. It must end with a quick and decisive success. The offensive must give us the initiative for the spring and summer. current year. In this regard, all preparatory measures must be carried out with the greatest care and energy. On the direction of the main attacks, the best formations, the best weapons, the best commanders and a large number of ammunition. Every commander, every ordinary soldier must be imbued with the consciousness of the decisive significance of this offensive. The victory at Kursk must be a torch for the whole world. I order:

1. The purpose of the offensive is a concentrated strike, carried out decisively and quickly by the forces of one shock army from the Belgorod region and the other from the region south of Orel, by means of a concentric offensive to surround the enemy troops located in the Kursk region and destroy them ...

2. Required:

a) widely use the moment of surprise and keep the enemy in the dark, primarily with regard to the time of the start of the offensive;

b) to ensure the maximum massing of strike forces in a narrow sector in order ... to break through the enemy defenses with one blow, achieve the connection of both advancing armies and thus close the encirclement ring ... Hitler. "There were thirteen points in operational order * 6. Further they set out the tasks: Army Group South to break through the front at the Prilepa-Oboyan line and connect at Kursk with the troops of Army Group Center advancing towards them; Army Group Center, inflicting a massive blow from the Troen-Maloarkhangelsk line, to break through the defenses in the Fatezh - Veretinovo sector and connect with the shock army of the Army Group "South" at Kursk and to the east. In the order, a significant place was given to measures aimed at misleading the Russians and maintaining the secrecy of the operation. Only those persons whose involvement was absolutely necessary.

In addition, preparations were underway for a false operation "Panther" in the zone of the Army Group "South". In order to successfully disinformation, it was planned to advance tanks, concentrate crossing facilities, radio communications, agent actions, and spread rumors.

The leadership of the Wehrmacht carefully developed and prepared the operation, which received the code name "Citadel". Hitler strove at all costs to regain the strategic initiative that had eluded him after Stalingrad, otherwise the loss of the war was inevitable. This operation was planned as a "single throw" aimed at the encirclement and lightning defeat of the Soviet troops in the Kursk region.

The Nazi command set the task for the troops

"... to ensure the maximum massing of strike forces in a narrow area in order, using local overwhelming superiority in all means of attack (tanks, assault guns, artillery, mortars, etc.), to break through the enemy defenses with one blow, to achieve the connection of both advancing armies and thus close the encirclement ring. The main line of the Soviet defense was supposed to break through within two days, and by the end of the fourth day of the offensive, the Wehrmacht strike groups were to connect east of Kursk. By encircling and defeating more than a million Soviet troops in the area of ​​the Kursk salient, the fascist German command intended to take revenge for Stalingrad.

At Kursk, the question was to be decided whether the initiative would finally pass into the hands of the Soviet Armed Forces or the Germans would be able to regain it. During the preparation of the operation, the timing of the German offensive was postponed several times by Hitler. The attack scheduled for May was then delayed until a brigade of new Panther tanks arrived. In May, Hitler held a meeting in Munich with the commanders of the armies and army groups "Center", "South" and the generals of the Wehrmacht to finally determine the composition of the strike groups. A strike from the south to Kursk was planned by ten tank, one motorized and seven infantry divisions. Seven armored, two motorized and nine infantry divisions were to take part in the offensive from the north. All the reserves of the fascist German command were thrown into this sector of the front. However, at the meeting, one of Hitler's close associates, Colonel General Guderian, expressed his doubts about the need for an offensive near Kursk. This shook Hitler, he was forced to change the timing of the offensive, but continued to blindly believe in the successful outcome of the operation.

"Never before have German troops in Russia," said the Fuhrer, "have been so well equipped with heavy tanks as they are now..."

Two thousand aircraft and two thousand seven hundred tanks were to fall on the troops of the Central Front of the Rokossovsky and Voronezh Fronts of Vatutin, which accounted for fifty percent of all enemy tanks and aircraft on the Soviet-German front. (During the battle, the Germans planned to bring in almost the same number of troops, tanks and aircraft from the reserve.)

At the end of June, in the Orlovsky and Belgorod directions, our reconnaissance discovered large movements of enemy armored and infantry formations. On July 2, the Headquarters informed the commanders of the Voronezh and Central Fronts that the Germans were about to go over to the offensive. This is the third warning. The first two were at the beginning and at the end of May, but turned out to be insolvent. The tension associated with the long wait had reached its limit. The excitement seized everyone - from the soldier to the front commander. This was the case when everyone wanted the enemy to go on the offensive as soon as possible. Otherwise, the Soviet command made a major miscalculation, giving the Germans time to organize defense in depth.

On the night of July 4, the situation changed dramatically, the Nazis intensified their reconnaissance operations in front of the defense front of the 60th and 65th armies. The intelligence chief reported to Chernyakhovsky that on the right wing, in the defense zone of the corps of General Kiryukhin, sixteen search groups of Germans were found hunting for "tongues", and on the left wing, in the defense zone of the corps of General Lazko, twelve. At the junction of these two buildings, German sappers cleared our minefields. The obvious activation of the enemy alerted Chernyakhovsky. And he immediately reported on VCh Rokossovsky: - On the night of July 4, the enemy conducted twenty-eight reconnaissance searches, before that the number of such searches was five, six times less. How is Pukhov doing? - In front of the front of Pukhov's formations, the enemy has not yet shown activity. Rokossovsky thought.

The commander of the Army Group "Center" could deliver the main blow in the defense zone of Chernyakhovsky and Batov. Such a strike, designed to dismember the battle formations of our troops, with their subsequent encirclement, also fraught with serious danger. Especially when the main forces of the Central and Voronezh fronts were aimed against the enemy offensive on the neck of the Kursk salient. Finally, Rokossovsky asked Chernyakhovsky: - What conclusion did you yourself come to? - Ensure full readiness to repel the offensive of the Nazis! - Undoubtedly, one must be prepared, but it seems to me that the Nazi generals are cunning. The same situation on the left wing of the defense of Batov's army! On the night of July 5, at the junction of the armies of Pukhov and Romanenko, our scouts discovered a group of German sappers clearing passages in minefields. Several enemy sappers were killed, two fled, one was taken prisoner.

Rokossovsky at two in the morning became aware of the testimony of the prisoner:

"The offensive is scheduled for 3 o'clock on July 5 ..." Consequently, only twenty minutes remained before the start of the artillery preparation planned by the enemy. Before the Military Council of the Central Front, the question was on the agenda: to believe these data or not? The adoption of a responsible decision to conduct counter-barrage preparation, designed to suppress the enemy at the starting positions for the offensive, depended on this. And, of course, it was carried out with the aim of disorganizing the offensive plans of the fascist German command. But it could turn out that the information of the scouts was erroneous and the troops of Army Group Center did not take their starting positions for the offensive. In this case, half of our ammunition, mines and shells could be fired at an empty place.

There was no time left for reflection and agreement with the Stavka. It was the greatest risk, but Rokossovsky ordered at two and twenty minutes on July 5 to open fire!

Links:
1. Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa without any preparation!
2. Formation of the Kursk Bulge
3.

The situation at the front in the spring of 1942, the plans of the parties, the German offensive in the summer of 1942, the beginning Battle of Stalingrad, German occupation regime, Holocaust on the territory of the USSR, partisan and underground movement, formation of the anti-Hitler coalition, results of the first stage of the war.

The situation at the front in the spring of 1942 G. Side plans.

The victory near Moscow gave rise to the hopes of the Soviet leadership for the possibility of an early defeat of the enemy and the end of the war. In January 1942, Stalin set the Red Army the task of going over to the general offensive. This task has been repeated in other documents.

Red Army - to ensure that 1942 becomes the year final defeat Nazi troops and the liberation of the Soviet land from the Nazi scoundrels!

The only one who opposed the simultaneous offensive of the Soviet troops in all three main strategic directions was G.K. Zhukov. He rightly believed that there were no prepared reserves for this. However, under pressure from Stalin, the Headquarters decided to attack in all directions. The dissipation of already modest resources (by this time the Red Army had lost up to 6 million people killed, wounded and captured) inevitably led to failure. Stalin believed that in the spring and summer of 1942 the Germans would launch a new offensive against Moscow, and ordered that significant reserve forces be concentrated in the western direction.

Hitler, on the contrary, considered the strategic goal of the forthcoming campaign a large-scale offensive in the southern direction with the aim of capturing the Lower Volga and the Caucasus. In order to hide their true intentions, the Germans developed a special plan to misinform the Soviet military command and political leadership, codenamed "Kremlin". Their plan was largely successful.

German offensive in the summer of 1942. Beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad.

By the spring of 1942, the superiority of forces still remained on the side of the German troops. Before launching a general offensive in the southeastern direction, the Germans decided to completely capture the Crimea, where the defenders of Sevastopol and the Kerch Peninsula continued to offer heroic resistance to the enemy. The enemy offensive in May ended in tragedy for the Soviet troops: in 10 days, the troops of the Crimean Front on the Kerch Peninsula were defeated. The losses of the Red Army here amounted to 176 thousand people, 347 tanks, 3476 guns and mortars, 400 aircraft. On July 4, Soviet troops were forced to leave the city of Russian military glory Sevastopol.

Picture: Defense of Sevastopol.

In May, Soviet troops went on the offensive in the Kharkov region, but suffered a severe defeat: the troops of two Soviet armies were surrounded and destroyed. Losses amounted to 230 thousand people, more than 5 thousand guns and mortars, 755 tanks. The strategic initiative again turned out to be with the German command.

At the end of June, German troops rushed to the southeast: they occupied the Donbass and reached the Don. There was a direct threat to Stalingrad. On July 24, Rostov-on-Don, the gates of the Caucasus, fell. Only now did Stalin understand the true purpose of the German summer offensive. But it was too late to change anything. Fearing the rapid loss of the entire Soviet South, Stalin issued Order No. 227 on July 28, 1942. He entered the history of the war as the order “Not a step back!”.

Our territory has become much smaller ... it has become much less people, grain, metal, plants, factories ... We already now have no predominance over the Germans either in manpower reserves or in grain reserves. Retreating further means ruining oneself and at the same time ruining our Motherland ... Not a step back! This should be our main call now... Unconditionally eliminate the retreating mood in the troops and with an iron fist suppress the propaganda that we can... retreat...
Form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (up to 200 people each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them to shoot alarmists and cowards in the event of panic and disorderly withdrawal of parts of the division ...

From the beginning of September 1942, street battles began in Stalingrad, destroyed to the ground. But the stubbornness and courage of the Soviet defenders of the city on the Volga did, it seemed, incredible - by mid-November, the offensive capabilities of the Germans had completely dried up. By this time, in the battles for Stalingrad, they had lost almost 700 thousand killed and wounded, over 1 thousand tanks and over 1.4 thousand aircraft. Despite Hitler's daily incantations, the Germans not only failed to occupy the city, but went on the defensive.

German occupation regime. Holocaust in the USSR.

By the autumn of 1942, German troops managed to occupy a huge part of the European territory of the USSR. A brutal occupation regime was established on the occupied lands. The main goals of Germany in the war against the USSR were the destruction of communist ideology and Soviet state, the transformation of the Soviet Union into an agricultural appendage and a source of cheap labor for the so-called Third Reich. In the occupied territories, all power belonged to the military command of the German army. Death camps were created for prisoners of war and those Soviet people who did not obey the decisions of the German authorities. Arrests, executions, hangings of party and Soviet activists, members of the underground have become a daily occurrence.

Labor mobilization covered all citizens of the occupied territories aged 18 to 45 years. They had to work 14-16 hours a day. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens were sent to forced labor in Germany.

The special master plan "Ost", developed even before the war, contained a plan for colonization and Germanization. According to it, in particular, it was supposed to destroy 30 million Russians, and turn the rest into slaves and resettle in Siberia.

From the comments and suggestions on the general plan "Ost" of the Reichsfuehrer SS G.Himmler

It is not only about the defeat of the state with its center in Moscow ... The point is most likely to defeat the Russians as a people, to divide them ... It is important that the majority of the population on Russian territory consists of people of a primitive semi-European type .. This mass of racially inferior, dumb people needs... leadership.

Jews, gypsies and other "inferior" peoples were generally subject to complete extermination. Considering the Jews to be the ideological support of the “Judeo-Bolshevik” regime, the fascists destroyed them along with the commissars without trial or investigation. During the first six months of the war, they destroyed up to 1.5 million Jews, almost every second of them on the territory of the USSR. The rest were imprisoned ghetto, where they were on the brink of survival.

In total, during the war years in the occupied territories of the USSR, the Nazis killed about 11 million people (including about 7 million civilians and about 4 million prisoners of war). They were shot, burned, gassed, hanged, drowned, subjected to monstrous torture and torture. But the threat of physical violence did not stop the Soviet people in the fight against the enemy, not only at the front, but also in the rear.

Partisan and underground movement.

The Soviet underground movement arose already in the first weeks of the war. In places subjected to occupation, underground party bodies of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks were created, acting as coordinators of all underground work. During various periods of the war in the occupied territory there were illegal Central Committees of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine and Belarus, 90 underground regional committees and inter-district party centers.

During the war years, more than 6 thousand partisan detachments operated on the territory of the country, in which more than 1 million people fought. Representatives of most of the peoples of the USSR, as well as citizens of other countries, fought in their ranks. Soviet partisans destroyed, wounded and captured more than 1 million enemy soldiers and officers, representatives of the occupation administration, put out of action more than 4 thousand tanks and armored vehicles, 65 thousand vehicles and 1100 aircraft.

They destroyed and damaged 1,600 railway bridges and derailed over 20,000 railway trains.

To coordinate the actions of partisan units in 1942, the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement was created, headed by P.K. Ponomarenko. Commander-in-Chief partisan movement K. E. Voroshilov was appointed. Underground heroes not only acted against enemy troops, but also carried out death sentences bloody executioners of his people. The legendary intelligence agent Nikolai Kuznetsov killed the Chief Judge of Ukraine Funk, Vice-Governor of Galicia Bauer, kidnapped the commander of the German punitive forces in Ukraine, General Ilgen. The general commissioner of Belarus to Cuba was blown up by the underground fighter Elena Mazanik right in bed in his own residence.

During the war years, more than 184 thousand partisans and underground fighters were awarded orders and medals of the USSR. 249 of them received the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. And the legendary commanders of partisan formations S. A. Kovpak and A. F. Fedorov became heroes twice.

Formation of the anti-Hitler coalition.

From the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Great Britain and the United States declared support for the Soviet Union.

From a radio speech by British Prime Minister W. Churchill 22June 1941

In the past 25 years, no one has been a more consistent opponent of communism than I have been. I won't take back a single word I said about him. But all this pales before the spectacle now unfolding. I see Russian soldiers standing on the threshold of their native land guarding the fields that their fathers have cultivated since time immemorial. I see them guarding their homes, where their mothers and wives pray - yes, for there are times when everyone prays - for the safety of their loved ones, for the return of their breadwinner, their protector and support ... Danger for Russia is our danger and US danger...

In July 1941, an agreement was signed between the USSR and Great Britain on joint actions in the war against Hitler, and in early August, the US government announced economic and military-technical assistance to the Soviet Union "in the fight against armed aggression."

In September 1941, the first conference of representatives of the three powers was held in Moscow, at which issues of expanding military-technical assistance from Great Britain and the United States to the Soviet Union were discussed.

After the US entered the war against Japan and Germany (December 1941), US military cooperation with the USSR expanded even more. On January 1, 1942, in Washington, representatives of 26 states signed a Declaration in which they pledged to use all their resources to fight a common enemy and not conclude a separate peace. The signed treaty on the union of the USSR and Great Britain (May 1942) and the agreement with the USA on mutual assistance (June 1942) finally formalized the military alliance of the three countries.

Results of the first stage of the war.

The first period of the Great Patriotic War, which lasted from June 22, 1941 to November 18, 1942 (the date the Soviet troops went on the counteroffensive near Stalingrad), had a great historical meaning. The Soviet Union withstood a military strike of such force that no other country could withstand. The courage and heroism of the Soviet people thwarted Hitler's plans"lightning war". Despite major military defeats in the first year of the war, the Red Army showed its high fighting qualities.

By the summer of 1942, thanks to the efforts of home front workers, the transition of the country's economy to a war footing was basically completed, which laid the main prerequisite for a radical change in the course of the war.

At this stage, formed anti-Hitler coalition, which possessed huge military, economic and human resources. All this made the victory over fascism a matter of time. The main result of the first period of the war was the formation of the prerequisites for a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War.

August 23 in Russia is the Day of the defeat of the Nazi troops by the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, which took place in 1943. It was the greatest tank battle of World War II.

The intensity of the struggle in the area of ​​the Kursk Bulge was due to a number of political, economic and strategic factors. Great Patriotic War by the summer of 1943 had reached an important turning point. Under the blows of the Soviet Armed Forces, already in the battle near Moscow, the fascist plans for a "blitzkrieg" collapsed. A year later, the fascist German armies suffered a crushing defeat at Stalingrad. Our Armed Forces have gained versatile combat experience in the fight against a strong and experienced enemy, and every day their combat power has been growing. The active army received more and more weapons and military equipment from the industry, which was reorganized on a war footing. In the summer of 1943, the Nazi army was still a powerful force capable of withstanding a long, intense struggle, and the political and military leadership of Germany was eager to take revenge for Stalingrad. In order to restore their prestige, to eliminate the confusion that had begun in the camp of their allies, the fascist rulers needed a major victory, and they did everything to achieve it at any cost. However, the Wehrmacht by that time was able to advance only in one strategic direction. The plan for the upcoming offensive of the Nazi troops near Kursk is described in sufficient detail in Order No. 6, signed by Hitler on April 15, 1943. According to this order, the task of the offensive was to destroy the Soviet troops in the area west of Kursk by means of a "concentric offensive" in order to encircle the Soviet fronts. One strike was planned to be delivered from the area south of Orel by the main forces of Army Group Center and the other from the area north of Kharkov by the main forces of Army Group South.

“This offensive,” Hitler's order said, “is given decisive importance. It must end with a quick and decisive success. The offensive should give us the initiative for the spring and summer of this year... The best formations, the best weapons, the best commanders and a large amount of ammunition should be used in the direction of the main attacks... The victory at Kursk should be a torch for the whole world. Already in the spring of 1943, the Soviet Supreme High Command had information about the impending summer offensive of the Nazi troops in the Kursk Bulge region. Intelligence data came with exceptional speed and accuracy. The direction of the enemy's main attack was also accurately determined. It was in connection with this that, in the rear of the Soviet troops east of the Kursk ledge at the turn of Tula, Yelets, Stary Oskol, Rossosh, the Headquarters concentrated large strategic reserves. Formations and formations that participated in the battle of Stalingrad, in the battles near Leningrad, as well as in other sectors of the Soviet-German front, were withdrawn to these areas. Initially, all these troops were united into the Reserve Front, which from April 15, 1943 became known as the Steppe Military District, and from July 10, 1943 it became the Steppe Front. There was almost no case in the history of wars when such powerful strategic reserves would be created, united by a single front command. By the beginning of the defensive battle, the Central and Voronezh Fronts had up to 20,000 guns and mortars, up to 3,600 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, and 2,370 aircraft. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in men by 1.4 times, in guns and mortars by 2 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns by 1.3 times. Thus, the grouping of our troops, concentrated in the Kursk direction, made it possible, indeed, to solve not only defensive, but also offensive tasks. During the preparation of the battle, intelligence provided the command with all the necessary information about the impending enemy offensive and about the steps that the German command was taking.

day after day(48.5MB)

On 1 July, Hitler announced the final decision to launch the offensive on 5 July. As at the beginning of the war, the fascist command counted on the surprise of the strike, which, according to Hitler, should have been facilitated by a large number of new tanks and assault guns. These intentions became known Soviet command. On July 2, the start of the operation was determined, about which the Headquarters immediately informed the commanders of the Central, Voronezh and Steppe Fronts. On the night of July 5, scouts captured German prisoners, who confirmed that the offensive was scheduled for 3 o'clock on July 5. The commanders of the Central and Voronezh fronts, with the participation of representatives of the Headquarters, decided to immediately conduct artillery counter-preparation. On the Voronezh Front, artillery counter-preparation was carried out twice: a five-minute fire raid on July 4 and July 5 from 03:00 to 03:30 - already during the artillery and aviation preparation of the enemy attack, which began at 02:30. On the Central Front, artillery counter-preparation was also carried out on July 5 twice - at 2 hours 20 minutes and at 4 hours 35 minutes - both times for 30 minutes. On both fronts, the first powerful fire strike was inflicted on the main means of attack. However, it was not possible to disrupt the enemy's offensive, although the interaction between the main forces and means of the enemy's first echelon was disrupted, and the strength of its initial strike was significantly weakened. With the enemy reaching the forward edge of the main line of defense of the 6th Guards Army, the position of the enemy troops was determined more precisely, and this required repeated counter-preparation. Air battles near Kursk went on continuously. Only on July 5, about 200 group and individual air battles took place. Our aviation was able to gain air supremacy, which had a very positive effect on the advancement and entry into battle of the troops of the Steppe Front.

Already the first hours of the offensive of the Nazi troops, which unfolded on July 5 at 5:30, showed that it was not proceeding as planned by the fascist command. The tank divisions of the enemy, thrown into a pre-prepared defense, suffered heavy losses, the pace of the offensive was low. Battle of Kursk lasted forty-nine days - from July 5 to August 23, 1943. The victory near Kursk marked the transition of the strategic initiative to the Red Army. By the time the front was stabilized, Soviet troops had reached their starting positions for an offensive on the Dnieper. After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and conducted Operation Citadel, later wrote: “This battle was the last attempt to maintain our initiative in the East. With her failure, tantamount to failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. Therefore, Operation Citadel is a decisive turning point in the war on the Eastern Front.