home crafts Illegal armed formations in Chechnya. Destroyed Chechen fighters

Illegal armed formations in Chechnya. Destroyed Chechen fighters

The experience of suppressing the bandit activities of Islamic extremists during the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus region indicates that the tactics of bandit formations opposing the federal troops have undergone significant changes. At present, along with traditional forms, it also includes large-scale offensive and defensive actions to capture and hold important strategic objects, is characterized by a wide range of bandit manifestations: from terrorist actions to open armed uprisings by small (15–20 people) and large (up to 500 people and more) in groups. At the same time, surprise, decisiveness, audacity and short-term raids are still the fundamental principles of the tactics of bandit formations.

The most important factor determining the specifics of the actions of gangs is the conduct of systematic "harassing" actions that force the troops to resort to defensive tactics, as was the case for almost two months in the regions of Dagestan bordering Chechnya. Moreover, they give the impression of the ability of bandit formations to strike anywhere, sometimes quite unexpectedly. "Disturbing" and "exhausting" operations form the basis of the tactics of the actions of bandit formations, which, as a rule, sought to evade direct confrontation with large forces of federal troops. Their actions in this case are based on preemption of the opening of fire, which is carried out accurately and mainly from short distances.

At the same time, as the experience of the Chechen company and especially the events in Dagestan showed, in some cases, when they achieve a tactical advantage, gangs make attempts to capture and hold for a long time an object that is important in tactical terms or in terms of life support for the population. This testifies to a new stage in the development of the tactics of armed confrontation between the separatists and the federal troops and the stake of the leaders of gangs on long-term and fierce resistance.

Organization and arming of illegal armed formations of Chechnya

An armed formation is a large paramilitary formation led by an authoritative political or military leader, created to protect the interests of a certain financial, economic and political (religious) group by force. An armed formation, as a rule, includes representatives of one or more related teips (jamaats).

The armed formation organizationally consists of commander (commander) headquarters and two groups (for the period of hostilities up to 500 people each).

Groupings, in turn, are subdivided into combat, intended for the direct conduct of an operation in a specified area, and reserve, intended for building up efforts and scheduled (usually in a week) replacement of warring fighters.

grouping is divided into five or six detachments (of 100 people or more), which are led by amirs (field commanders).

Detachment usually consists of three groups.

First- the central group (up to 100 people), which is constantly in a combat state with the amir and does not have a permanent place of deployment.

Second group (the number depends on the size of the territory and can be up to 20 people) is located in locality. This group is subordinated, controlled and connected only with the amir. The members of the group were trained in a special training center and specialize in mining, sniper shooting and sabotage and reconnaissance activities. The militants of the second group are deeply, conspiratorial and are engaged in legal social activities.

Third group - a group of "helpers". These are like-minded people and supporters of the Amir, living at home. In order to save money, this group is not constantly with the detachment. In the case of the Amir's order, they come to him and carry out the task, then return home again and do their usual business or act independently with the consent of the Amir.

In this way, central the group is the main formation of the detachment and consists of three platoons on three departments in everyone. The group is armed with only easy-to-carry weapons, as it is constantly on the move, attacking and leaving. The time, place and purpose of the attack are appointed by the Amir.

Approximate armament and equipment of the bandit squad:

Radio stations-2pcs, binoculars-2pcs, map of the area -2pcs, cartridges 7.62 mm for PK-1000-1300pcs, 5.45mm - 500–600pcs, 4pcs. RPG-18 "MUHA"; each militant has a flask for water, spare clothes, a raincoat, a sleeping bag, medicines, dry rations for 7 days

Tactics of actions of Chechen extremists during the aggression on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan in August-September 1999

The tactics of actions of armed extremists and Dagestan separatists in the operation on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan included mainly two stages:

The first is preparation for the operation;

The second is the direct conduct of a military operation and terrorist acts.

The leadership of the extremists for the armed action in the Republic of Dagestan identified three areas in advance: to the west of BOTLIKH, near the settlement. ANDI and the GIGATLI area. Accordingly, three armed formations were created: the main and central one under the leadership of Shamil Basayev, the northern one - Shervani Basayev and the southern one - Bagautdin. In total, the formations, estimated, there were up to 3,000 militants. Formations were structurally divided into battalions (50-70 people each), companies (15-20 people each) and platoons (5-7 people each).

Preparation for the operation and terrorist acts

The stage of preparation for the operation involved conducting detailed reconnaissance and direct training of the militants and the combat area.

Detailed reconnaissance of the area of operation included:

Studying the terrain, approach routes, difficult areas and roads in gorges, dominant heights, natural shelters, water sources.

reconnaissance of the locations of federal troops, their security and defense systems, storage sites for weapons and ammunition, military equipment, the nature of the activities of the troops, the routes of advancement for subsequent ambushes and mining of roads.

During the reconnaissance, detailed video filming was carried out.

Immediate preparation of the operation:

Development of the plan (distribution of forces and means to objects, time and sequence of the operation.).

Creation of warehouses and caches of weapons, ammunition, food and water supplies.

Recruitment of local residents on the basis of religious, national and kinship principles, indoctrination of identified supporters and carrying out propaganda activities with their help to attract as much as possible more residents on their side.

Negotiating with the administration and local residents through persuasion, bribery or threats in order to ensure their support and conduct joint actions with the militants or not interfere with their actions against the Federal forces;

Creation of detachments and recruitment of mercenaries from among local residents.

Combat training of units in base camps and training centers.

The beginning of the Chechen war is one of the most tragic pages in our history.

On December 24, 1994, troops of the RF Armed Forces entered Grozny. Rather, it is difficult to call it the introduction of troops - the troops were abandoned, practically at random. Without any preliminary assessment of the situation and accurate intelligence. Many experts gave their assessment of the unforgivable miscalculation of the General Staff in those days, many Russians and residents of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CHIR) know that the beginning of the first campaign was only a consequence of the complete lack of control on the part of state authorities in the republic.

How did the war in Chechnya start?

In 1991, the current colonel of the Armed Forces of Russia and the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev, proclaimed the independence of Ichkeria, looking back at the republics of the disintegrating USSR (Transcaucasia, the Baltic states, Central Asia).

Dudaev photo

On the part of Moscow, this step was not commented on by anyone, no official statement was made on this matter, which gave rise to the Dudayev regime to gain momentum, terrifying in its scale. In those years, according to various sources, up to 15 large military formations were stationed on the territory of the CHIR, and there were a large number of weapons (from infantry to artillery). Unless there was an air base with MIGs and SUs (the nearest large air base of the USSR Armed Forces was located 650 km to the east, in an Azerbaijani village called Nasosny).

Chechen guy with RPG 7

Having come to full and uncontrolled power in the republic by Moscow, Dzhokhar Dudayev began to arm his own army, various alternative military units were formed (including women's battalions). As in the days of the Zaporozhian Sich, the Chechen army and illegal armed formations at that time were regularly replenished by various asocial elements: convicts released without any reason, deserters of the USSR Armed Forces, adventurers from all the republics of the USSR, the first mercenaries arrived from Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Chechnya. Beginning of the massacre

At the beginning of 1994, Dudayev's "army" was a power comparable in strength and ability to the army corps of the fronts of the Second World War. According to various estimates, quantitative composition Dudayev's army could reach 50,000 personnel.

Lawlessness of militants

During 1994, illegal formations under the command of Dzhokhar Dudayev committed a number of frankly criminal acts, including: forging bank advice (the losses of Sberbank of the Russian Federation amounted to billions of rubles), seizing a sealed wagon with the national currency of Azerbaijan (manats, which were printed and sent from France) - they say Heydar Aliyev was forced to pay "tribute". The precedent did not develop into an international scandal only by pure chance.

In the trains passing through the territory of the CHIR, conductors were regularly killed (shot), passengers were robbed by people in uniform and with machine guns. These and many other manifestations of the criminal nature of the gangs of "independent Ichkeria" became the official reason for the introduction of troops into the territory of the CRI.

December 24, 1994 can be considered the day of the beginning Chechen war. With air support, the first columns of infantry formations began to move into Grozny, among the fighters the vast majority was the draft in the fall of 1994. These and many other ill-conceived decisions of the Ministry of Defense subsequently led to tragic consequences. Despite the fierce resistance of the illegal armed formations under the command of Dzhokhar Dudayev, during the first few days, the RF Armed Forces captured Grozny. A new milestone in the history of "hot spots" began ...

Infrastructure of illegal armed formations

The most important condition for the effective actions of militants is a developed infrastructure. In the period between the wars, a network of military bases (permanent and transshipment), strongholds, warehouses and areas for the placement of leadership personnel was actively created. The base areas (BR) of the gangs were well equipped in engineering terms, had a developed network defensive structures and were under the cover of air defense systems. On the territory of each BR there was a headquarters, a training center, warehouses, repair shops, a hospital, and residential buildings. All of them were deployed in mountainous Chechnya. (Today, most of them have been destroyed by Russian troops.) The bases were intended for the deployment of armed formations, the storage of their weapons and property. Transshipment bases and points were intermediate places for supplying militants and were located mainly on the plain. In the southeastern and southwestern regions of Chechnya, according to intelligence data, more than 60 bases and warehouses with stocks of weapons, ammunition, medicines, and food were equipped.

To ensure partisan actions, a whole network of hiding places with material and financial resources was created. Moreover, the number of caches was so great that a significant part of them has not been discovered so far. From 1996 to 1998, five radio intelligence centers were deployed on the territory of Chechnya. Three of them were located in the Nozhai-Yurtovsky district, two - in the western part of the republic. The attendants of these centers were Americans and British. According to available information, NATO officers and space communications engineers worked as military advisers in some large formations. The militant leaders had access to NATO space intelligence data. The "special" position of Chechnya allowed Maskhadov's regime, using information chaos, to create by 1999 a clear system of control and communication in the interests of the operation of the military machine of illegal armed formations. Gossvyaznadzor bodies practically did not act in the republic, the decisions of the Russian government regarding the procedure for using the radio frequency spectrum, the established rules for the acquisition and commissioning of radio communication systems and means on the territory of Chechnya were not implemented.

By 1999, a widely ramified communications system had been established in Chechnya. Its basis was:

Cellular radio communication network of the NMT-450 standard, which has access to other regions of the Russian Federation;

Communication systems based on the use of radio-electronic means of leading foreign companies (Motorola, Kenwood, Ikom, etc.);

Radio relay communication lines;

Stationary and mobile broadcasting stations;

Radio networks of short-wave communication of production and technological structures and international organizations, such as the Red Cross;

Information and reconnaissance radio networks of illegal armed formations based on amateur HF radio transmitters;

Cable communication lines;

Portable and mobile radio communications that are not part of mobile communication systems and operate in the VHF band (136-174; 300-350; 390-470 MHz), as well as radiotelephones in the 860-960 MHz band. The cellular mobile radio network of the NMT-450 standard (two base stations), one of which was located in Grozny, was interfaced with the cellular communication system of Ingushetia. The AMPS cellular base station, located in Ingushetia, provided radiotelephone communications to militants who had terminals of this system in Chechnya. All this allowed field commanders to have from 20 to 60 correspondents in the radio networks, and from 60 to 80 active correspondents in the intelligence and information network of the HF band. In the period from 1996 to 2000, the Chechen side purchased and received from various states and extremist Islamic organizations a large amount of weapons and ammunition, however we are talking exclusively about small arms and anti-tank and anti-aircraft missile systems(for example, the Taliban leadership handed over 24 Stinger MANPADS). At the end of 1999, illegal armed formations were such only in the light of their common struggle with the federal forces, but not in the sense of general leadership. The basis of illegal armed formations was formed by detachments of field commanders, who carried out operations on their own, only coordinating them with the General Staff. They only combined for larger operations. Possible ways transfers of MANPADS to Chechnya Despite the fact that the number and organizational structure of illegal armed formations were constantly changing (depending on the tasks being solved, the specific situation, the availability of forces and means), it seems possible to trace general organizational approaches. At the head of large gangs were such leaders of the all-Chechen level as Basaev, Gelaev, Khattab, Baraev, who controlled entire branches of local "business" and significant areas of the republic's territory. Each of them led, as a rule, 1-2 groups, numbering 500 or more people. One grouping was intended for combat operations, the second (reserve) - to make up for losses and the planned replacement of the belligerents. Usually rotation was carried out after five to seven days. Each group consisted of several detachments of 100 to 150 people. The detachments were led by field commanders (amirs). The detachment consisted of three groups. The most numerous (80-100 people), well trained and equipped, was directly under the amir in constant combat readiness, often changing their places of deployment. The second (special) was deployed in the village and was subordinate only to the commander of the detachment. Members of this group (20-30 people) were engaged in the usual economic activity with special training behind them. The militants of the third group (20-30 people) lived in their settlements. By order of the amir, they arrived in the detachment, completed the task and returned home. They could act independently, but with the consent of the commander, and also collected information, delivered the necessary resources to the places of hostilities. The core of the detachment was a combat group, consisting of 3 platoons (20-25 people) with 3 squads (up to 10 people) in each. The department was equipped with machine guns (PK-1, RPK - 1); RPG - 1; SVD - 1; machine guns - 6; RPG - 18 ("Fly") - 4–5. Cartridges for PK-1200-1500; to RPK-800-1000; to SVD - 150–200; to the machine - 400–500. Grenades for RPGs - 3–6; manual fragmentation - 4-6 for each militant; radio stations -1-2; binoculars - 2–3; terrain maps - 1–2. Each militant also had a flask of water, a set of spare clothes, a raincoat (tent), a sleeping bag, medicines, dry rations for 5-7 days. In addition, each combat group could have 1–2 DShK or NSV, 1–2 ATGMs, portable MLRS or recoilless rifles, 1–2 mortars, 1–2 memory devices, 2–3 MANPADS. In order to seize strategically important parts of the territory and settlements, various illegal armed formations united into large groups. For example, in preparation for the invasion of Dagestan, three armed formations were created: central (under the leadership of Shamil Basayev), northern (Shervani Basayev) and southern (Bagautdin) with a total number of up to 3,000 militants operating in the areas of the settlement. Botlikh, Andi and Gigatli. Structurally, the formations were divided into battalions (50-70 people each), companies (15-20 people each) and platoons (5-7 people each). On the whole, illegal armed formations at the end of 1999 looked like this: Presidential Guard Commander - Magomed Khambiev. Two companies of the presidential guard. Honor guard company. In total - about 300 people. Military establishment Main Headquarters, chief - Olkhazar Abuev. Departments: Combat Command, Logistics and Transport, Personnel, Troop Service, Ideology and Religion. Command and support battalion (Khankala). Six motorized rifle battalions (about 60 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles; Severny, Khankala, Gudermes, Naurskaya). Tank regiment (about 25 tanks; Shali). Mixed artillery battalion (3 self-propelled guns, 5 Grad MLRS, 20 guns of caliber above 100 mm). Anti-aircraft battalion (15 anti-aircraft artillery installations, about 40 MANPADS). Sapper Battalion. Medical Battalion. Reconnaissance and sabotage company. Several regiments of territorial defense (framed). In total - about 2500 people. Ministry of Sharia Security Minister - Abu Movsaev. Department of Sharia Public Security. Department of Sharia Penitentiary Institutions.

1st Islamic Regiment special purpose(Alkhan-Kala and Achkhoy-Martan). 2nd Islamic Special Purpose Regiment (Grozny). In total - about 1300 people. Antiterrorist Center Head - Brigadier General Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov. Investigation teams (Gudermes). Rapid Response Group (Gudermes). In total - about 350 people. National Security Service Department of Foreign Intelligence. Department of counterintelligence. Department of Transportation Safety. Department of Safety in Industry. Special Forces Detachment "Borz". Commander - Musa Khodzhaev. In total - about 500 people. Ministry of the Interior Headquarters. Departments: personnel, criminal police, automobile inspection, fire protection. Regional departments. In total - about 5000 people. Border and Customs Service Department of Border Guard and Customs Service. In total - about 400 people. Tax Service Department of Tax Service. In total - about 100 people. Formations of field commanders Detachment of Shamil Basayev and "Brigadier General" Khasan Dolguev. Vedeno, Shali - about 2500 people. (Dolguev was killed in December 1999) Ruslan Khaikhoroev's detachment. Bamut, Achkhoi-Martan and Sunzha districts - about 500 people. (The commander was killed in October 1999) Elkhoev's detachment. Suburb of Bamut - about 50 people. Boguraev's detachment. Ishcherskaya - about 100 people. Detachment of Ruslan (Khamzat) Gelaev. A suburb of Grozny, Urus-Martan, Shatoi, Komsomolskoye, Achkhoy-Martan - about 500 people. Detachment of Salman Raduev. Gudermes, New Gordali - about 600 people. Detachment of Vakhid Murdashev and Yamadayevs. Gudermes, Novogroznensky - about 150 people. (Since November 25, 1999 - on the side of the federal troops.) Geliskhanov's detachment. Nozhai-Yurt district - about 150 people.

Detachment of Emir ibn al-Khat-tab. Serzhen-Yurt, Shali, Vedeno - about 550 people. Detachment of Arbi Baraev. Urus-Martan, Bratskoye - about 200 people. Detachment of Turpal-Ali Atgeriev. Shelkovskaya - about 200 people. "Field commander" Vahid Murdashev Khatashev's detachment. Urus-Martan - about 300 people. Detachment of Magomed Aslutdinov. Kyunghee - about 100 people. Abalaev's detachment. Zandak - about 150 people. (Since November 25, 1999 - on the side of the federal troops.) Self-defense formations. A significant number of units that are created in almost every settlement from among its inhabitants. Foreign mercenaries and volunteers. citizens Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Yemen, Qatar, Kuwait, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, Albania and other countries - about 1000 people.

The nature of the actions of illegal armed groups.
The changed geopolitical conditions posed little-studied problems for the Russian Armed Forces, since the troops, performing the tasks of restoring the constitutional order and disarming illegal armed formations (IAF) in the Chechen Republic, faced qualitatively new circumstances, a fundamentally atypical operational situation for them, which can be characterized as a large-scale internal armed conflict with all the signs of a local war. The nature and scale of this conflict were such that they required the involvement of formations and units of the grouping of general-purpose troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies of the Russian Federation into the combat zone.
Attempts to solve emerging problems in traditional ways, inherent in ordinary situations, in the conditions of an internal armed conflict, in many cases do not achieve the desired effect, lead to the loss of initiative, the collapse of elements of the management cycle, which ultimately jeopardizes the implementation of decision and leads to unjustified human losses.
This circumstance predetermines the direction and necessity of forming a modern concept for the use of groupings of general forces in cooperation with other troops, military formations and bodies in an armed conflict and a local war, in accordance with which theoretical provisions, composition, forms of application and methods of action, a command and control system and targeted training of joint groupings of troops (forces) intended for combat operations to eliminate an armed conflict both on the territory of the country and in regions of strategic importance for Russia.

For the defense of Grozny, the Chechen command, similarly to the events of 1995, created three defensive lines:
- internal - with a radius of up to 1 km around Minutka Square;
- medium - at a distance of up to 1 km from the border of the inner boundary;
- external - passed through the outskirts of Grozny.

The defense system of the illegal armed formations in Grozny was characterized by the following features:
1. the presence of an extensive network of underground communications, pre-prepared bases and warehouses with weapons, ammunition and food, a large number of shelters and basements to protect militants during bombing and assault strikes;
2. flexible communication system that allows you to quickly respond to changes in the situation;
3. the presence of mobile groups and reserves, which were quickly transferred to the necessary areas;
4. mining approaches to strong points and laying directional landmines; the presence of containers with chemical poisonous substances (chlorine and ammonia) prepared for an explosion, etc.
A focal defense system was created within the city, which included firing positions for armored vehicles, artillery, anti-tank weapons, and anti-tank barriers. The lower floors of houses in the main directions were equipped for long-term firing points. Windows and entrances to the basements of houses on the outskirts of Grozny, along main streets and at intersections were covered with sandbags, stones and bricks. Loopholes were left for observation and firing. Most of the armored vehicles and artillery were camouflaged in residential areas and enterprises. On the roofs and upper floors of buildings, firing positions of snipers and anti-aircraft gunners were created, and important objects and approaches to individual military camps were mined. Street intersections in Grozny were littered with reinforced concrete slabs, heaps of gravel, sand and other materials. DOTs were built. They were built at crossroads, connecting passageways with adjacent courtyards for hidden occupation and maneuver. Responsible persons for the defense of quarters and streets were appointed, and the commandant's service was strengthened.

The management system of illegal armed formations in Grozny included city defense headquarters, headquarters and command posts of detachments and groups. Each body and control point of the illegal armed formations, the commander of a separate detachment had mobile means of communication.
Command posts, weapons storage bases, ammunition depots, medicines and food depots were also created in advance. Military camps and bases were used to deploy command posts. There was a fairly well-established system of centralized leadership of all armed formations in the Chechen Republic. The Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Republic independently managed their paramilitary structures. The main command posts of the armed formations were located in the capital of the republic, while the spare ones were located in other regions.

A characteristic feature of the militant communication system was the use of small-sized radio stations such as "Motorola" and "Kenwood", the use of closed communication channels by the top leadership of the illegal armed formations. The stability of the communication system was ensured by a wide network of repeaters. The militants' radio exchange procedure was characterized by strict communication discipline and the use of covert command and control measures, including coded messages about their location and planned activities.

For conducting reconnaissance illegal armed groups used predominantly the local population, mostly women, girls, old people and children, who almost unhindered approached the columns, positions and areas of concentration of troops, entered into conversations with military personnel, counted the approximate number of troops, equipment and weapons, and then transferred the obtained information to the militants.
Intelligence was also carried out by special reconnaissance and sabotage groups from the special forces. In order to obtain and verify information about our troops, the leaders of the intelligence agencies of the illegal armed formations also used hostage, mainly in relation to the Russian population. Threatening to kill and holding family members hostage, the militants demanded certain information about the troops from relatives, and only upon receiving it guaranteed the release of the hostages.
Target reconnaissance for artillery and fire correction carried out by specially appointed spotters. As a rule, disguised as local residents or refugees, they were located on the top floors of high-rise buildings or cruised past the location and positions of federal troops.
One of the ways of conducting reconnaissance of illegal armed formations was the interrogation of prisoners or hostages of military personnel of the Armed Forces and internal troops.
The militants received a significant part of the information from our radio networks by listening to them, in particular, units of the internal troops and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, which did not fully use closed communication channels.
The beginning of the first stage of the assault on the city of GROZNY was characterized by stubborn resistance from illegal armed formations in strong points along the routes of advance of troops.

The defense of Grozny was organized by sectors, which were assigned to groups (combat, reserve of up to 500 people), consisting of detachments of 100 people, which in turn are divided into groups of 10-20 people each, armed with small arms and grenade launchers. Seeping through the battle formations of the federal troops to their rear, these groups acted in squads of 4-7 people. (the commander is also a radio operator, 1-2 snipers, 1-2 grenade launchers armed with RPG-7, 1-2 machine gunners or machine gunners, who, as a rule, have 2-3 disposable RPGs or RPOs). In the basements and attics of many houses on the streets suitable for the movement of equipment, stocks of shots for RPGs (disposable RPGs and RPOs) were concentrated. The so-called "leaving stocks" tactic, widely used in Lately guerrilla groups around the world. There were several sabotage and reconnaissance groups from special detachments, in particular, the name of Sheikh Mansour, battle banner and documentation, which were captured when the detachment left the city. Total population militants concentrated in the city of Grozny amounted to 6,000 people.

A characteristic feature of the tactics of the actions of gangs it turned out that when delivering air and artillery strikes, the militants took refuge in shelters and prepared basements of houses to reduce losses, and also tried to get as close as possible to the positions of the federal troops. The tactics of action became more and more diverse and sophisticated, and at the same time it was continuously improved.
Despite the blockade of the city, the militants were able to penetrate into Grozny, delivering ammunition, food and medicine, as well as evacuate the wounded. The main exit routes for the militants were the following areas: the village of Kirov, Chernorechye, Aldy, Starye Promysla, Staraya Sunzha. When trying to overcome the minefields, the militants made passages in them, driving animals into the minefields, and on the night of January 29 to January 30, 2000, when a large detachment (more than 400 people) left, people.
During the hostilities, the leadership of the illegal armed formations actively carried out reconnaissance activities to clarify the grouping and deployment of units of the combined group. Facts were noted indicating that the militants were using a reconnaissance system and warning of air and artillery strikes.
The system of supplying militant groups with weapons, ammunition, food and other materiel included pre-prepared warehouses and bases.
The militants paid considerable attention to the conduct of psychological warfare.. To raise morale, the leadership of the gangs actively spread misinformation about the significant losses of the federal forces. To distribute fakes, the leaders of the illegal armed formations attracted foreign correspondents, whose task was to select and mount photo and video materials about the alleged victories of the militants and the atrocities of the federal troops, as well as distribute these materials in the media and on the Internet. In the Grozny region, under the guise of Russian military personnel, a detachment of militants operated, which carried out executions of civilians.

The strengths of the NVF include:
* high mobilization opportunities;
* a clear control system that ensures the centralization of the leadership of armed formations with the autonomous nature of their combat operations;
* proximity to the structures of army-type formations, the presence in their composition of units and subunits of various purposes (motorized rifle, mountain rifle, tank, artillery, air defense, reconnaissance, communications, and others);
* the national-ethnic and religious community of the contingent, contributing to the solution of issues of moral and psychological support, maintaining discipline;
* the presence of a professionally trained contingent of mercenaries.

Weak sides of the organizational structure of illegal armed formations were:
* lack of units and subunits of the rear and technical support;
* a significant number of militants with a criminal past and criminal inclinations, who corrupted the illegal armed formations from within and gave rise to conflicts both between individual militants and formations.
The management of illegal armed formations was carried out centrally using modern means of communication. Active reconnaissance of a group of federal troops and consolidated units of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs was constantly conducted. Communications of Dagestan and Ingushetia were used to deliver weapons, ammunition and mercenaries to Chechnya.
Main reasons successful actions militants were:
1. thorough reconnaissance and preparation for raids;
2. skillful misinformation, surprise, swiftness, decisiveness and coordination of actions;
3. high personal professional training most of the militants.
From the first days of hostilities, the federal troops were faced with the widespread use of snipers by illegal armed groups. The scope of their actions was such that military experts rightfully started talking about "sniper warfare."
Single snipers operating in Chechnya were, as a rule, professional mercenaries, many of them were athletes. They were thoroughly prepared for conducting sniper warfare in settlements and mountains, they planned and coordinated actions in advance, chose advantageous positions, and established communications. Corner apartments were a favorite place for snipers, from where it was possible to fire in several directions. At the prepared positions, hiding places were equipped, in which a sniper rifle and ammunition were disguised. In order to make it difficult to detect, the fire, as a rule, was conducted by snipers from the depths of the rooms.
The general leadership of the city's defense was carried out by A. Maskhadov, direct - by Sh. Basaev. In accordance with the plan for the defense of the city, the leadership of the illegal armed formations intended to conduct fighting within 20 days after the start of the assault on the city in order to inflict maximum damage on the federal troops. In the future, it was supposed to make a breakthrough and leave the city in mountainous areas Chechnya.

conclusions
1. Federal forces, which carried out the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the restoration of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic, was actually opposed by a well-trained, mono-ethnic, reinforced by mercenaries from other states, psychologically ready for death, army.
2. The tactical methods used by illegal armed formations were distinguished by a variety of forms and methods of armed struggle, but they were based on general rules, which can be attributed to the principles of their combat use. The main ones were:
* close relationship with the local population;
* actions mainly by small detachments and groups;
* careful reconnaissance and selection of the object, place and time of the attack;
* the use of infiltration and concentration tactics in the area of the assigned task;
* evasion of protracted positional combat operations;
* skillful use of terrain and conditions of limited visibility;
* exhaustion of the enemy;
* psychological support for subversive activities;
* blocking units of federal troops (checkpoints, checkpoints) in areas of deployment, depriving them of the possibility of maneuvering forces and means with simultaneous fire and psychological impact;
* covert penetration to the entire depth of the area where federal units are located, simultaneous impact from several directions;
* high controllability of units and groups, their mobility and high professionalism.
The illegal armed formations promptly changed their tactics of action, reacting to weak, stereotyped aspects in the actions of the federal troops. At the same time, methods prohibited by the Geneva Conventions were used, such as the capture and execution of hostages from among the civilian population, and terrorist acts.
3. The defense of the city was characterized by the following features:
- a pre-prepared system of many-layered defense, which included heavily fortified strongholds and lines;
- knowledge of the area and the city by the militants;
- the presence of an extensive system of underground communications, a large number of shelters and basements;
- the presence of poisoning agents in the militants chemical substances;
- the possibility of covert movement from one area of the city to another;
- keeping civilians in the city and using them as a "human shield";
- the presence of pre-created warehouses and bases with weapons, ammunition and food, including in underground shelters;
- an effective control and communication system that allows you to quickly respond to changes in the situation;
- the presence of mobile groups and reserves, the ability to quickly transfer them to the necessary areas;
- mining approaches to strong points and laying directional landmines.

Toolkit

Some Issues of Organization and Tactics of Actions of Illegal Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic

Introduction

Organization and arming of illegal armed formations of Chechnya

The armed formation organizationally consists of commander (commander) headquarters and two groups (for the period of hostilities up to 500 people each).

grouping is divided into five or six detachments (of 100 people or more), which are led by amirs (field commanders).

Detachment usually consists of three groups.

First- the central group (up to 100 people), which is constantly in a combat state with the amir and does not have a permanent place of deployment.

Second a group (the number depends on the size of the territory and can be up to 20 people) is located in the settlement. This group is subordinated, controlled and connected only with the amir. Members of the group were trained in a special training center and specialize in mining, sniper shooting and sabotage and reconnaissance activities. The militants of the second group are deeply, conspiratorial and are engaged in legal social activities.

Approximate armament and equipment of the bandit squad:

Tactics of actions of Chechen extremists during the aggression on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan in August-September 1999

The tactics of actions of armed extremists and Dagestan separatists in the operation on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan included mainly two stages:

The first is preparation for the operation;

The second is the direct conduct of a military operation and terrorist acts.

Preparation for the operation and terrorist acts

The stage of preparation for the operation involved conducting detailed reconnaissance and direct training of the militants and the combat area.

Detailed reconnaissance of the area of operation included:

Studying the terrain, approach routes, difficult areas and roads in gorges, dominant heights, natural shelters, water sources.

Reconnaissance of the locations of the federal troops, their security and defense systems, storage sites for weapons and ammunition, military equipment, the nature of the activities of the troops, advance routes for subsequent ambushes and road mining.

Illegal armed formations in Chechnya. Destroyed Chechen fighters

Recommend other articles

Material for self-study

Preparing for the Unified State Examination in History: Civil War