Assault aircraft in the Afghan war. Losses of Soviet aviation during the war in Afghanistan

Interest Soviet Union, and then its successor, the Russian Federation, to Afghanistan has a very long history. In the middle of the 19th century, this mountainous country with rugged terrain became the arena of rivalry between Russian Empire, seeking to expand its sphere of influence and acquire a port on the Indian Ocean, and british empire determined to protect its interests in India. After World War II, the attention of the Soviet Union to this region increased significantly. Both Afghanistan and Iran shared several thousand kilometers of borders with the USSR and were buffer states against forces hostile to the Soviet Union. Back in 1925, the USSR began to provide assistance to the Royal Air Force of Afghanistan, and in the 50s. XX century became their main supplier of military equipment.

In 1973, the monarchy in Afghanistan was overthrown, but the republican government that came to power, headed by General Mohammed Daoud, continued to maintain friendly relations with Moscow. The country's armed forces were equipped with new Soviet equipment, which was purchased in large quantities. This was especially true for the Air Force, where by the end of the 70s. more than 180 units of military equipment were in service, including MiG-17, MiG-19 and MiG-21 fighters, Su-7BM attack aircraft and Il-28 bombers.

In April 1978 there was a military coup. Daoud died, and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) headed by Mohammed Hyp Taraki came to power. Soon he was replaced by Hafizullah Amin, who was educated in America and for this reason was not trusted in the USSR. Land reform hastily began in the country, which caused discontent among the general population. An uprising broke out. Several army units went over to the side of the rebels. In March 1979, the rebel forces grew so large that they were even able to capture Herat, a large city in the west of the country, where hundreds of government soldiers were executed, as well as about fifty Soviet advisers and their families.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE INVASION

At that moment, there were over a thousand advisers from the USSR in Afghanistan. Not wanting to further risk their lives, the Soviet Union began planning an operation to bring its troops into this country, which, according to the plan of Soviet strategists, should have led to the stabilization of the internal political situation in Afghanistan. However, the fate of the advisers was not the only factor that worried the USSR. The Soviet leadership was also seriously alarmed by the apparent resurgence of Muslim fundamentalism and wanted to send unequivocal warnings to Iran and Pakistan through the upcoming invasion. Army General Epishev, in addition, signed an agreement with the then Afghan government, according to which 100 T-62 tanks and 18 Mi-24 fire support helicopters were delivered to Afghanistan.

Further attacks by the rebels led to the fact that the USSR supplied the Kabul regime with 18 more Mi-24 helicopters, including several fire support vehicles of modification D. In December 1978, the Soviet-Afghan friendship treaty was signed. It was registered with the UN in September 1989. According to this pact, in the event of a threat to the security of any of the parties, the other side received the right to intervene to eliminate such a threat. A few weeks before the start of the invasion, the Soviet command concentrated on air bases in Bagram and Shindand. placed at his disposal, shock units numbering up to 6,000 soldiers. Between 24 and 26 December 1979, when all Western countries politically and militarily, they were powerless to do anything, the intensity of Soviet air traffic increased sharply. In total, about 300 flights of military transport aviation were noted.

On December 27, Soviet special forces attacked the presidential palace in Kabul, and after the overthrow of Amin, former Deputy Prime Minister Babrak Karmal, who had been in exile before the invasion, was put in power. At the same time, the 15,000-strong Soviet grouping of troops began its advance from the Soviet border into the depths of Afghanistan. It was covered from the air by MiG-21 fighter-bombers and Mi-24 fire support helicopters.

The Afghan representatives of the Islamic fundamentalist movement put up strong resistance in the countryside, declaring jihad, a "holy war" against the Soviet troops. The United States began secretly supplying weapons to the rebels. Initially, they organized the supply of Soviet-made weapons from Egypt.

Just as the British and Soviet military once did, they discovered that the territory of Afghanistan was simply impossible to control. The Mujahideen, operating in small groups, easily found refuge in mountainous terrain and distant valleys. Soviet bases and airfields scattered throughout the country were islands in a hostile world.

Soon fighting got into a dead end. Soviet troops regularly carried out operations to clear this or that area from the rebels, however, as soon as they left, the Mujahideen returned again. As a means of fire support, the Soviet command widely used helicopters. Both fighter-bombers based in Afghanistan itself and long-range bombers operating from bases in the Soviet Union also took part in the operations. A special tactic was developed, which consisted in the fact that mobile ground forces drove the insurgents out into the open, where they were destroyed from the air by helicopters.

CONDITIONS OF BATTLE OPERATIONS OF AIRCRAFT ON THE TERRITORY OF AFGHANISTAN

70% of the territory of Afghanistan is occupied by mountains with poor vegetation. The height of the Hindu Kush mountain range is up to 6-7 thousand meters. The depth of the gorges reaches 3000 meters, and the width of some of them is such that even a helicopter cannot turn around there. In the north of the country there is a plain, in the south and southwest there is a large desert.

Heaps of rocks and stones make it extremely difficult to detect ground targets.

8 months a year over Afghanistan is sunny, hot weather. Temperature up to +50 degrees. But at this time, there may be a restriction on flight weather due to dust storms and too high temperature air.

Mountains make it difficult to use ground-based RTSs. The main method of aircraft navigation is considered to be flight according to the course and time with constant control of the path by visual reference points. However, the monotony of the mountainous terrain makes it difficult to navigate.

Airfields and landing sites are at a significant elevation above sea level (up to 2500 m). This reduces the range of combat aircraft and the time spent over the battlefield.

MILITARY TRANSPORT AVIATION IN AFGHANISTAN

In conditions when the movement of military columns along the roads was fraught with significant risk and required very strong security, Soviet and Afghan troops were forced to use mainly transport aircraft both to deliver manpower and equipment from the USSR to Afghanistan, and to redeploy troops within the country . Interestingly, many Soviet transport aircraft flying to Afghanistan carried Aeroflot identification marks, although they were piloted by VTA crews.

The main types of military transport aircraft used to transport troops and cargo in Afghanistan were the An-22 Antey, Il-76 and An-26.

An-22 was the largest transport aircraft of all that made regular flights to Afghanistan. However, the main part of the traffic both from the USSR to Afghanistan and within Afghanistan was carried by the jet Il-76. By the time the troops entered Afghanistan, the Soviet VTA had already, in the main, managed to rearm with these machines instead of the An-12 turboprops. However, the An-12 was also not completely abandoned.

The Afghan Air Force had a small transport aircraft, which was armed with various types of aircraft. The most modern of them was the An-26. Equipped with an auxiliary power unit located in the engine nacelle, the An-26 proved to be excellent in conditions of heat and high mountains and turned out to be indispensable for transporting small loads.

Military transport aviation (VTA) of the USSR Air Force began to be used for the transfer of cargo to the military airfields of Afghanistan in the pre-war period. Already at that time, a helicopter squadron of 280 ovp and a military transport squadron (detachment) of 10 An-12 aircraft were based at the Bagram airfield.

December 25, 1979 at 18.00 local time, the airborne assault began as part of the 103rd Airborne Division and a separate RAP. 55 BTA aircraft were involved in this operation. The length of the route was more than 2 thousand km, and several times the aircraft had to go in complete radio silence. Aircraft landing was carried out at the airfields of Kabul and Bagram. It took 10-15 minutes to unload.

Military transport aviation made 343 flights, including 66 An-22 flights, 77 Il-76 flights, 200 An-12 flights, totaling 47 hours. Thus, air transport delivered the first Soviet military units to Afghanistan. total strength 7700 people, with 894 units of military equipment. In addition to personnel and military equipment, 1062 tons of various cargoes were delivered. However, this was only 2% of the total volume of cargo that transport aircraft had to deliver to Afghanistan.

At the same time, the VTA and the paratroopers suffered their first losses in Afghanistan. At 19.35 on December 25, when landing in Kabul, an Il-76 aircraft under the command of Captain V.V. Golovchin, carrying 37 paratroopers and 7 crew members, crashed into a mountain and exploded. On the morning of December 26, General Egorov took off from the squadron of the 280th Air Regiment in a helicopter to the disaster area. However, it was not possible to start a search and rescue operation, both because of the weather conditions and the lack of necessary forces and means. In a hurry, climbers were called from the army sports club who trained in Central Asia. They were given weapons, given 5 paratroopers as guards, and sent to the fall area. On January 1, 1980, after three days of searching, the cockpit of an aircraft with the body of the commander was found in the mountains. Most likely, the plane caught on one of the mountain peaks, and broke in half ...

In subsequent combat operations, it was the daily work of military transport aviation that to a large extent ensured the operations of the entire Limited Contingent. From 150 to 200 flights were operated monthly both within Afghanistan and to the Soviet Union and back. In preparation for and during large-scale operations, the number of BTA sorties reached 400-500 per month. The crews continuously performed the tasks of supplying the contingent Soviet troops everything necessary not only for military operations, but also for life. Parts of the VTA provided maneuver for front-line and army aviation. A significant share in the total volume of traffic was made up of humanitarian cargo intended for Afghans. The garrisons regularly flew around and took away the seriously wounded and sick, ambulance aircraft, for which, according to the mobilization plan, Il-18 passenger aircraft were re-equipped.

Flights for transportation were carried out, as a rule, with the maximum load. The delivery of cargo and ammunition by transport aviation was carried out at a lower cloud cover of 1000 meters. However, this rule was often violated due to the requirements of the combat situation, and the most trained crews of the VTA units performed flights even at a cloud base of 800 and even 600 meters.

In connection with the conversation about transport aviation, it is impossible not to mention the ominous symbol of the Afghan war - the "Black Tulip". This was the name of the An-12 military transport aircraft, which was used to transport coffins with the dead. In fact, this name comes from the name of a funeral company in Tashkent that produces coffins upholstered in zinc, especially for the OKSV. From eight to fifteen coffins were usually loaded into the plane, this load was accompanied by an officer from the unit where the dead were from or a close friend who was in battle with the deceased comrade. Having delivered the cargo to the Union, they were transferred to the district military registration and enlistment offices, from where the dead were called up.

In total, the crews of military transport aviation alone carried out 27 thousand aircraft flights in Afghanistan (of which 14,700 were in the face of enemy air defense), transported more than 880 thousand personnel and about 430 thousand tons of various cargoes. More than 1,700 BTA servicemen have been awarded orders and medals. During the war, 2 Il-76, 5 An-26, 8 AN-12 and 1 An-30 were lost from anti-aircraft fire of dushmans and as a result of accidents. A favorite tactic of the Mujahideen was to place anti-aircraft weapons near Soviet air bases, and "catch" planes on takeoff or landing. So, in February 1983, an An-12 was shot down over the Jalalabad airfield while landing from a MANPADS, all crew members died. And already in July of the same year, another An-12 was shot down from the DShK over the same airfield on takeoff. There were 8 people on board, all of them died.

FRONT AVIATION IN AFGHANISTAN

Fighter and fighter-bomber aviation in Afghanistan solved the following tasks:

• air support of troops, cover of transport columns and escort ground forces in raid operations;
• air strikes against identified enemy targets;
• cover for helicopter units;
• destruction of firing points, strongholds of the Mujahideen;
• aerial reconnaissance;
• covering the territory of the DRA in the general air defense system.

The main burden of combat work during the Afghan war lay with the Air Force of the 40th Army (until 1980 - the 34th Aviation Corps). At different times, in rotation military units, six fighter aviation regiments passed through the aviation of the 40th Army ( iap), one assault aviation regiment ( hat), one separate attack aviation squadron ( oshae), one separate mixed aviation regiment ( osap), four fighter-bomber aviation regiment (ibap), eight separate helicopter aviation regiments ( ovap), eleven separate helicopter aviation squadrons ( ovae).

The headquarters of the Air Force of the 40th Army was in Kabul. The main air bases were the airfields of Kabul, Kandahar and Bagram. Airfields had equipment from the USSR, which simplified the task of repair and maintenance on them Soviet aircraft. According to the aviators, living conditions there in the first winter were a real nightmare. They lived in tents and dugouts, somehow escaping from snow and cold rain. They didn’t take off their clothes for two weeks - there was still nowhere to wash them. But over time, real towns grew up around the airbases, with power plants, boiler houses and water supply.

It must be said that for the first time after the introduction of the OKSV, the Soviet leadership did not rule out the invasion of Afghanistan by troops of US-friendly countries in the Middle East, and even by the United States itself. Based on this scenario, fighter aircraft were needed. In the future, all fighters performed purely assault missions - the Mujahideen did not have aviation.

To destroy manpower, unprotected and lightly armored targets, one-time bomb cassettes (RBK), cannons, NURS S-5 and S-24 with proximity radio fuses were used to detonate at a height of 15-30 m. and high-explosive fragmentation bombs with a caliber of 250-500 kg and NURS S-24 with a contact fuse.

Attack aircraft Su-25 - "comb"

At the first stage, the fighter group of aviation of the 40th Army was represented by the MiG-21bis aircraft, the latest modification of the MiG-21. There were cars of two versions: in the usual configuration and with an additional set of radio systems for short-range navigation RSBN. The latter significantly simplified flights in difficult conditions, making it possible to perform round-the-clock descent and landing approach even with limited instrument visibility. An instrumental approach was allowed up to a height of 50 m at any time of the day and in any weather conditions. Another advantage of the MiG-21bis was an increased flight range with a ventral external tank (up to 1480 km) and increased capabilities in terms of weight and arsenal of weapons (up to one and a half tons of bombs, 32-charging UB-32 units, gun GSh-23L). Thus, far from being a new MiG-21bis, in some respects it surpassed even more modern machines, such as the MiG-23.

As a purely attack aircraft, an older modification of the "twenty-first" - the MiG-21PFM was used (in March 1980, the units armed with them were withdrawn and re-equipped with more modern MiG-21SM). As fighters, they were no longer of value, and they were still quite capable of firing and bombing ground targets.

The first case of a clash with the use of aviation occurred on January 9, 1980. Afghan partisans successfully attacked a military column marching from Termez to Fayzabad. Losses killed in the convoy amounted to 42 people. Combat aircraft were called. The planes worked in pairs, in turn, shooting a large number of foot Mujahideen and cavalry with NURS almost in open areas.

Already in February-March 1980, aviation was used "with might and main": fighter-bombers supported the advance of motorized rifle units, which eliminated the centers of resistance of the Mujahideen. The first major operation of this kind was carried out in March in Kunar province. The reinforced motorized rifle regiment was supposed to go to the settlement of Asabad in order to release the garrison of government troops. The only road leading to the city, which went mainly along the mountain ledges. Fighter-bombers supported the advance of the ground troops, however, small firing points were difficult to detect in the rocks, especially at high speed, and strikes had to be made mainly on squares. Aircraft controllers who were in the battle formations of the ground troops themselves often could not determine where the fire was coming from. Not without strikes on their units, but fortunately, there were no casualties.

Another common method of combat work was reconnaissance and strike actions, colloquially - "hunting". Fighter-bombers carried out reconnaissance in designated areas, and when targets were detected, they attacked them, having previously received permission to use weapons.

Subsequently, more modern Soviet front-line MiG-23ML/MLD fighters were sent to Afghanistan. They, like the MiG-21, performed mainly ground strikes (with the exception of rare clashes with the Pakistan Air Force) and have proven themselves very well.

Attack aviation in Afghanistan was represented by Su-17 fighter-bombers and Su-25 armored subsonic attack aircraft. The latter turned out to be especially well adapted for mining from the air. He was also involved in strikes against pre-planned targets, and in support of troops. The Su-25s also conducted independent reconnaissance and strike operations, hunting for caravans and campsites of Afghan partisans. At the same time, the combat load was chosen to be universal and included a pair of bombs or RBCs of 250-500 kg caliber and two UB-32 or B-8 blocks. The recognition of the merits of the Su-25 was the fact that the ammunition that came from the Union was primarily distributed in favor of these aircraft, since they gave the best result. Yes, and aircraft controllers preferred to work with pure attack aircraft, and not fighter-bombers - armor protection and lower speed allowed them to work on ground targets at a height of 600-1000 m (fighters - from 2000-2500 m), with minimal risk of “hooking” their own. Aircraft controllers especially noted the accuracy of attack aircraft, the power of their strikes and the ability to "point work".

But the MiG-27D fighter-bomber has not found wide application in Afghanistan. This aircraft was designed for air operations in Western Europe, during which it was envisaged to strike from low altitudes. It was equipped with modern avionics, but turned out to be unnecessary in the conditions of Afghanistan, where efficient, simple and reliable aircraft took advantage.

The tactics of attack aircraft depended on the combat situation, weather conditions, target characteristics and combat mission. As a rule, 4 groups were distinguished:

• air defense suppression (2-4 fighter-bombers) - struck by NURSs or RBCs in the target area and on both sides of the combat course;
• target designation (2 Mi-8 or a pair of aircraft) - designated the target with NURSs;
• strike group (4-8 fighter-bombers) - to deliver the main strike on the target;
• strike results control group (2 reconnaissance aircraft).

However, such a scheme was more relevant for combat work on the plain, where there is a lot of space. In narrow gorges, one most powerful bombing and assault strike was used so that the enemy did not have time to disperse.

The following strikes were used:

Pair dive strike - after detecting the target, the leader performed a turn with a slip and a half-turn, introduced the aircraft into a dive, usually at an angle of 30–40 or more steep descent. The height of the bombs and the lower limit of the withdrawal were determined by the conditions of safety from air defense fire, fragments of their own bombs and the features of the mountainous terrain. The wingman lagged behind the leader before the attack, increasing the distance for freedom of maneuver and, aiming independently, followed him in a combat approach

"Carousel" - a more complex scheme in which aircraft come in to bomb with small impacts, providing a continuous effect on the target. Required precise calculation and coordination of actions.

Cabriolet bombing - used to hit targets with a known location, usually areal. Thus, it was possible to throw bombs, for example, over a mountain range, while remaining outside the air defense coverage area. Having accelerated in a gentle descent, the aircraft performed a slide with an angle of 25-30 o (or up to 45 o) with the separation of bombs at the top point and turned to the side. The bombs went up along the trajectory, flying a few more kilometers to the target

Night strike - the leader, having found a target or focusing on its approximate location, drops parachute light bombs from a height of 2000–3000 m and strikes in the next run using 6–8 minutes of illumination. When acting in pairs, the wingman, following the safety conditions of a night flight with an interval of 2–3 minutes, attacks with bombs, NAR or cannon fire from a gentle dive from a distance of 1500–2000 m. For secrecy, combat maneuvering was carried out while being above the SAB torches, where the aircraft remained invisible In the dark.

Since 1984, Su-24 front-line bombers have been used in Afghanistan. These aircraft could carry 7,000 kg of bomb load, had a range of 2,400 km, and could be used from the airfields of the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts. The immediate reason for their involvement in military operations was the grandiose offensive of the Soviet troops planned for the spring-summer of 1984 on the Panjshir Valley - the stronghold of the famous field commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. In this operation, the Su-24 carried out carpet bombing of the defensive positions of the Mujahideen along the route of the Soviet troops. The bombing was carried out from a height of 5000 m. However, special success they did not, partly because the bombers were too fast and the bombs were not very effective (a direct hit was required to destroy the thick-walled adobe structure), partly because Ahmad Shah Massoud withdrew his main forces from the valley in advance.

The Su-24 proved to be a reliable machine, but its capabilities for counterguerrilla warfare were redundant. However, where the total destruction of all life was required, they coped best. Preference was given to the powerful FAB-1500 bombs in conjunction with the RBC-500. The FAB-1500s were the first to reach the ground, destroying the walls of the duvals, and the RBC-500s flew after them. The latter, during the explosion, scattered hundreds of thousands of steel 5.5-mm balls, cutting everything into dust in an area of ​​400 by 600 m. If the Mujahideen hid in the green, they were mowed down along with it.

Gradually, the strengthening of the air defense of the Mujahideen led to the fact that at the end of the war the Su-24s were forced to work already from 7500-8000 m, respectively, the accuracy of bombing became very approximate.

Su-24s worked in Afghanistan until the very withdrawal of OKSV. During the days of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, bombers "chopped off their tails", striking at Salang, the Charikar valley, and areas from Kabul to Pyanj. Moreover, after the departure of the Soviet contingent, the Su-24s were for some time ready to support Najibullah's troops in the event of a direct threat to Kabul from the opposition. However, the storming of the city did not follow, and on March 6, the bombers were given a “retreat”.

During the Afghan war, the losses of Soviet attack aircraft turned out to be quite significant: 21 MiG-21, 11 MiG-23, 34 Su-17 and SU-22 (export version of the Su-17), 1 Su-24 (as a result of an accident), 36 Su-25, 2 Yak-28 and 1 Yak-38.

LONG RANGE AVIATION

Long-range aviation in Afghanistan was represented by Tu-16, Tu-22M2, and later - the latest at that time Tu-22M3. Aircraft long-range aviation were relocated from other regions of the Soviet Union closer to Afghanistan - to the airfields of Hydabad, Semipalatinsk, Mary and Mary-2.

The advantages of Long-Range Aviation, due to which such a powerful force was attracted to combat work in Afghanistan, were as follows:

• the ability to "cover" any point in Afghanistan from airfields on Soviet territory;
• the possibility of using air bombs with a caliber of 3000, 5000 and 9000 kg.
• independence from weather conditions;
• more advanced navigation equipment than on front-line aircraft;
• invulnerability from anti-aircraft fire of dushmans, since flight and bombing were carried out at altitudes of the order of 10 km.

However, if the Su-24 front-line bombers were ill-suited for counterguerrilla warfare, then Long-Range Aviation aircraft were not created for these purposes at all. They are intended primarily to destroy strategic objects and the rear of the enemy, and the partisans, as a rule, carried all their property with them and did not have a developed infrastructure.

The only case combat use Long-range aviation, more or less according to its intended purpose, was the bombardment of lapis lazuli mines in the Jarma district, which were the economic basis of the power of Ahmad Shah Massoud. Bombing was carried out from a height of 10-12 thousand meters, while the mines themselves were at an altitude of 6729 meters above sea level. The effectiveness of the bombing could not be established.

The next operation with the participation of Long-Range Aviation was the already mentioned offensive on Panjshir in 1984. The Tu-16 and Tu-22M2, like the Su-24 bombers, could not realize their potential here. Their bombs of 3000, 5000 and 9000 kg calibers did not correspond at all to the tasks of combating manpower - they appeared in the 1940s as a means of combating large ships. Meanwhile, the radius of lethal damage by the FAB-3000 shock wave did not exceed 39 m, and even for the FAB-9000 it remained within 57 m.

However, since 1986, Long-Range Aviation has again been involved in work in Afghanistan. This time, her task was the destruction of caves and other fortified objects of the Mujahideen. Often such shelters, being carved into solid rock, withstood hits of 500-kilogram bombs. Large caliber bombs came in handy here. A high-explosive impact caused cracking and collapse of the caves. Bombing on the slopes gave good results. The descent of a huge mass of stones tightly filled up the entrances to the caves, cut a few mountain paths, and caused the collapse of the cornices. All this created additional difficulties for the partisans.

In the fall of 1988, a separate long-range aviation group was created, the main task of which was to cover the units withdrawn from the DRA. It included the Tu-16 of the 251st Guards TBAP from Bila Tserkva and two Tu-22M3 squadrons from the Poltava 185th Guards TBAP. At this time, the bombing took on the character of a counterbalance to the growing guerrilla activity, since the ground units Soviet army had already begun to withdraw, and there was little use from the Afghan allies. Kabul was already constantly subjected to rocket attacks from various groups of the Mujahideen, and "long-range" were attracted to respond to them. They bombed the outskirts of the city, paying special attention to the places where the launches were seen, but the effectiveness of combat work was low - the launchers were mounted mainly on cars and quickly left the impact. At the end of November 1988, the lapis lazuli and emerald mines of Masud were again bombed.

Long-range aviation aircraft worked under the cover of fighters. They feared, first of all, Pakistani aviation. The use of Tu-22M3 heat traps to divert Mujahideen missiles with infrared seekers was common practice. Three Tu-22PD electronic warfare aircraft also flew in the Tu-22M3 combat formations, the task of which was to disrupt the possible launch of Pakistani missiles by the Krotal air defense system and, especially, F-16 attacks.

From the beginning of February 1989, flights were carried out without Tu-22PD escort, since most of the targets were located in the central regions, far from the border. The last sortie of the crews of a separate long-range aviation group practically coincided with the moment of the complete withdrawal of troops. On February 14, when only General Gromov and his escort were left to cross the border, the "long-distance" bombers bombed the northern regions. The Afghan government insisted on the continuation of the bombing by Long-Range Aviation as compensation for the departure of the 40th Army, but they did not go for it. Nevertheless, the "long-range" lingered at the Mary airfield for three weeks after the withdrawal of troops, in combat readiness "just in case", and left it only on March 13, 1989. During the war in Afghanistan, Long-Range Aviation managed to do without losses.

HELICOPTER WAR

According to the estimates of air controllers who worked in combat formations of ground units, it was helicopters that had the highest efficiency with fire support. The use of helicopters allowed the Soviet command to quickly respond to the partisan tactics of the Mujahideen. Helicopters were used for fire support of ground units, pursuit of the retreating enemy, air patrols of the area and escort of convoys, landing troops at key positions, supplying troops, rescuing downed pilots and evacuating the seriously wounded. (True, in areas with an elevation above 2500-3000 m above sea level, helicopters were already working at the limit of their capabilities, and here Su-25 provided fire support to the troops).

Helicopters became real flying tanks and armored personnel carriers, which were not afraid of the most rugged terrain. That is why helicopters were priority targets for Mujahideen fire. A favorite tactic of the Mujahideen was to let a helicopter fly over their camouflaged positions and then open fire in pursuit. In May 1980, the Mi-24s appeared in the air for the first time, armed with machine guns for firing backwards.

Mi-24 is a combat helicopter with a partially armored body. In the basic version, the armament included a heavy machine gun for firing forward, NURS blocks, and 4 ATGMs of the Falanga-M complex. Subsequently, it was modified several times. The most massive version was the Mi-24V with a USPU-24 mobile machine gun mount with a four-barreled 12.7-mm YakB-12.7 machine gun, 16 ATGMs and weapons units with various types of unguided aircraft missiles (NARs). Additionally, the helicopter could carry bomb weapons.

Mi-24s played a leading role in the Afghan war. By the end of 1980, the number of Mi-24s in the 40th Army was increased to 251 units. In combat, the Mi-24, as a rule, fired rockets from 1200-1500 m, and opened fire from a machine gun at a distance of 800-1000 m. Helicopter armament was quite effective against enemy manpower: each S-8 NAR warhead provided a solid defeat within a radius of 10-12 m, and a four-barreled machine gun gave especially powerful and accurate fire and pierced a duval up to half a meter thick. 250 and 500 kg air bombs or 500 kg incendiary tanks were used to destroy fortified objects resistant to NAR.

In the first months after the introduction of Soviet troops, Mi-8 helicopters were added to the Mi-24 helicopters to strengthen helicopter air support, some of which were borrowed from the civil airline Aeroflot. Mi-8s did not have such formidable firepower as Mi-24s, but they were indispensable in landing operations. They were most often involved in ensuring the delivery and evacuation of special forces groups during reconnaissance operations, raids, and ambushes. By the way, in Afghanistan, the Mi-8 flew as a flight engineer, later Hero of Russia, Guards Lieutenant Colonel of the Special Forces of the Airborne Forces - a fairly well-known personality.

The volume of daily combat work carried out by helicopter pilots defies any description. If in 1985 the average number of sorties per Su-25 was 216, and for the MiG-23 - 112, then on average there were 360-400 sorties per helicopter, and for some aircraft the number of sorties per year reached a thousand.

Hence the terrifying, in comparison with other types of aircraft, the number of losses - 333 vehicles, of which 28 Mi-6 heavy transport helicopters, 174 Mi-8 transport and combat helicopters and 127 Mi-24, 4 Mi-9 and Mi-10 combat helicopters. To this number should be added another 338 Mi-8/17 and Mi-25/35 of the Afghan army.

Many of these vehicles were not shot down directly by Mujahideen fire, and outwardly their death looked like an accident. However, helicopter accidents occurred mainly as a result of entering risky flight modes in extreme combat conditions. For example, an attempt to escape from rocket fire on a low-level flight, resulting in a collision with the ground.

AIR DEFENSE OF THE MUJAHEAD

Afghan militant with the Stinger air defense system

In the initial period of the war, the air defense of the Mujahideen consisted of small arms. In addition, they had no training for shooting at flying aircraft. At first, the “Chinese method” was used, when the entire detachment opened massive fire in front of the aircraft in the expectation that it would hit the wall of bullets.

But over time, the dushmans acquired DShK heavy machine guns and 14.5-mm ZGU anti-aircraft mountain mounts with a range of up to 2000 m. According to pilots, the mountains literally “sparkled”, especially near partisan bases and strongholds. In 1985, the detachments of Ahmad Shah Massoud received 30 20th Swiss Oerlikon-Berle anti-aircraft guns with a reach of 2000 m. Gradually, the Mujahideen learned to build an air defense system around their bases, using the mountainous terrain. The firing points were camouflaged and spaced so that when one of them attacked, the aircraft or helicopter would come under fire from the others. Cars began to increasingly "bring" bullet holes. Sometimes the damage was very serious.

In response, Soviet aviation in combat operations began to be allocated special air defense suppression groups from fighters with NAR or RBC with ball or fragmentation equipment. In this case, it was necessary to achieve direct hits. The destruction of the calculation did not solve anything - other Mujahideen immediately took the place of those killed. Only disabling the fire weapon itself could silence the firing point.

A further increase in the anti-aircraft capabilities of the Mujahideen is associated with the saturation of their air defense with MANPADS different types, which in a roundabout way got into Afghanistan. At first, it was the Arrows and Red Eyes that were easy to use. They did not require specially equipped positions, they could be used from cars and roofs of buildings, and even secretly delivered directly to airfields. The first cases of using MANPADS were recorded in 1983, and since 1986 this phenomenon has become widespread. The advantage of MANPADS was also the fact that undermining a powerful warhead missile put an aircraft or helicopter out of action even without a direct hit. The result of the damage, as a rule, was the loss of the car.

In the fall of 1986, the Mujahideen received the Stinger MANPADS, expanding the range of their air defense to 3500 m. From that moment on, a real fierce struggle for air unfolded. Soviet pilots had to forget about low level flying. Working from safe heights became a condition of survival. And all the same, aircraft increasingly received serious combat damage and died. The impoverished highlanders turned out to be a surprisingly formidable opponent for Soviet aviation, not to mention the Air Force of the Afghan government.

PAKISTAN AIR FORCE INCIDENTS

The Soviet presence in Afghanistan did not create problems for neighboring countries, with the exception of Pakistan, where it affected almost immediately and had far-reaching consequences. Thousands of refugees poured into Pakistan across the border, including the Mujahideen. Having set up bases in Pakistan, they carried out raids against Soviet troops in Afghanistan from there. Violations of the border became inevitable, since its line was determined very roughly, and the Soviet and Afghan allies were eager to strike back. Sometimes violations of the Pakistani-Afghan border were accidental, out of ignorance, sometimes deliberate, in connection with the requirements of the combat situation.

Initially, the Pakistani Air Force showed restraint, especially since relations between the USSR and Pakistan were not entirely bad, and both sides acted on the principle of "a bad peace is better than a good quarrel." Another reason for the “peacefulness” of Pakistan was the outdated fleet of fighter aircraft: Mirages-III and Chinese MiG-19s with short-range missiles did not have much chance of intercepting Soviet aircraft.

However, the situation gradually escalated, especially after several tragic incidents. So, in July 1981, helicopter pilots delivered a group of sappers to mine the road going from Peshawar to Jalalabad. As a result, they mistakenly mined the Pakistani section of the road, which led to casualties.

Pakistan began to strengthen its northern border by deploying the Krotal air defense system there. From January 1983, the Pakistan Air Force received F-16 fighters, which dramatically strengthened their positions. In the end, it was decided that the Pakistan Air Force was obliged to respond to violations of the border, and the squadrons based in Peshawar and Kamra were put on alert. Despite the fact that since 1980, Pakistani fighter-interceptors had to take off many times on alarm, it was not until May 1986 that they managed to impose an air battle on the intruder for the first time.

From that time until November 1988, F-16s from Nos. 9 and 14 Squadrons shot down seven intruder aircraft, one of which was classified as a probable intruder. In the first skirmish, the commander of the 9th squadron, Kuadri, shot down the Su-22 with an AIM-9 missile. The second intruder was hit by fire from a 20-mm cannon, but managed to escape towards the border and allegedly fell or made an emergency landing on Afghan territory. March 30, 1987 Lieutenant Colonel Razzak shot down an An-26. The latter performed the task of transporting cargo and personnel to the Khost airfield, located just 15 km from the Afghan border. The fact is that the Khost area was completely surrounded by the Mujahideen, and held on only thanks to the air bridge. Soviet planes performing supply missions were forced to huddle close to the border and expose themselves to attack. Subsequently, Pakistan claimed that the aircraft was "reconnaissance".

However, on April 29 of that year, fortune turned its back on the Pakistanis, who lost one F-16 in combat with six Afghan aircraft. It is possible that this F-16 was shot down by its own leader, who then claimed to have destroyed the enemy vehicle. The Afghans returned home without losing a single plane.

On August 4, 1988, Major Bokhari of the 14th Squadron shot down a Soviet Su-25 piloted by Alexander Rutskoi, who later became Vice President of Russia. On September 12 of the same year, Captain Mahmud from the 14th squadron opened his own combat account by shooting down two MiG-23 fighters. On November 3, the same pilot shot down a Su-22 fighter-bomber. On January 31, 1989, the same Mahmud watched the An-24, which he flew to intercept, crash while trying to land. This was already the second An-24/26 shot down that winter. The first transporter was destroyed on the night of November 20-21, 1988, however, the Pakistani Air Force did not officially confirm this fact.

The Soviet pilots were aware of the constant danger coming from the Pakistani side. During the actions of strike groups in the border areas, a pair or a link of MiG-23MLD, armed with missiles and carrying PTB-800, was necessarily sent to escort. The fighters carried two R-24R and two R-60 missiles, combining weapons for long-range and short-range maneuverable combat. In addition to rockets, without fail equipped with full ammunition for the gun. The cover was carried out by the method of screening in the air with duty in the zones on the most probable directions of enemy attack.

According to some reports, Soviet aircraft managed to shoot down several Pakistani fighters, in particular, a case is given when a MiG-23MLD shot down one F-16.

WITHDRAWAL OF THE FSUE AND THE RISE OF THE TALIBAN

By August 1988, 50% of the Soviet military contingent had returned to the USSR. The complete withdrawal of all Soviet troops was completed in February 1989.

However, the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from Afghanistan did not lead to the end of hostilities. Various rebel groups began to fight not only with the Kabul regime, but also among themselves, as a result of which the Najibullah government lasted another three years, which surprised many. This is partly due to the fact that the former communists shared power with the most powerful of all the mujahideen factions.

In April 1992, President Najibulah was finally overthrown, and an Islamic regime was established in the country, headed by President Rabbani. Masoud was appointed Minister of Defense in his government, who began fighting against the forces of the Patan Hezb-e-Islami movement, led by former Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

To prevent Hekmatyar from seizing power, Massoud formed an alliance with General Abdul Rashid Dostum. The latter controlled a province in the north of the country centered on the city of Mazar-i-Sharif, and previously served in the army of the communist Kabul government.

The Air Force of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has undergone Islamization and purge. Air bases fell under the control of various groups. The Kabul and Bagram bases became the backbone of Masud's Air Force, Shindand and Jalalabad went to Hekmatyar, and Mazar-i-Sharif to Dostum. The situation was complicated by tribal strife, often taking the form of an armed conflict.

The backbone of Hekmatyar's power was the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, and it was from there that a new, much stronger threat emerged in 1994.

The Islamic militia of the Taliban consisted mainly of religious students - followers of the fundamentalist teachings of Mullah Muhammad Omar. Capitalizing on the hostility of various warring factions, the Taliban quickly enlisted the support of the broad masses of the population and took control of vast areas in the south of the country.

The fierce fighting continued until September 28, 1996, when the Taliban finally captured Kabul. Then it seemed that the capture by the fundamentalists of the north of the country had already been decided and it was just a matter of time. However, the Taliban alienated many of their former supporters, primarily by their extremely harsh interpretation of Islamic law. Taking advantage of this, Ahmad Shah Massoud united a significant part of the detachments of the former Mujahideen around him and dealt a strong blow, pushing the Taliban troops to Kabul.

The combat readiness of the Air Force units that fell under the control of various warring factions fell to very low level. Only transport planes and helicopters occasionally took to the air. In 1995, several Afghan Air Force fighters and at least three Su-20 fighter-bombers belonging to the Mujahideen were shot down, one of which was destroyed by an Afghan Air Force MiG. The Taliban also lost several helicopters.

With the departure of the Soviet Army, the war did not end, it entered a new stage...

The Afghan war and events in the Middle East led to a serious change in the structure of the Soviet Air Force in this direction and, first of all, in the aviation of the southern districts - TurkVO and SAVO. Previously considered a secondary South, it had fighters from the 12th Air Defense Army and front-line aviation (FA) of the districts, which numbered only three regiments of the IBA, armed, moreover, with far from new equipment (Su-17 of the first series and MiG-21PFM). The bombing forces of both districts were limited to the only regiment of the FBA - the 149th BAP in Nikolaevka on the Yak-28I. In the early 80s. a number of measures followed to increase the strike capabilities of this grouping: the regiments were re-equipped with new equipment, and some fighter units were transferred from the air defense to the subordination of the air force, reorganizing them to strengthen the IBA and FBA. Although there were still no Long-Range Aviation (DA) forces in the districts, all of its units remained concentrated in the European part of the country, on the border with China and Far East. However, the formidable shadow of Long-Range Aviation hovered over Afghanistan from the very first days of the introduction of troops ...

Assuming extreme scenarios for the development of events, up to an open clash with the "forward detachments of imperialism" and "reactionary Arab regimes", the command took appropriate steps to ensure the operation. Although the original directive of the General Staff of December 24, 1979 only required “to put on full combat readiness ... the aviation of the TurkVO and SAVO for a possible increase in the group of Soviet troops in Afghanistan,” the readiness affected almost all units of the Air Force and Air Defense, including Long-Range Aviation. Unlike the usual alarms carried out according to the scenario of a nuclear conflict, this time the "long-range" task was to ensure the advance of the troops, if necessary, using their strike capabilities and crushing resistance with conventional ammunition. So, in Engels, even Myasishchev’s emki of the 1096th and 1230th TBAP were preparing for bombing attacks, removing fuel “barrels” from tankers and converting them for suspension on cluster holders of 52 FAB-250 or 28 FAB-500. Tu-16s from Orsha were transferred to the Khanabad airfield closer to the border, and to Semipalatinsk - from Priluki. They took everything they needed with them, including large-caliber bombs. They received a combat mission on the spot - to strike at the northwestern outskirts of Herat, and due to the ambiguity of the situation (the first reports of "satisfying the request of the Afghan side for military assistance" appeared only on December 29), the flight was required to be made under the cover of darkness. The reason for this order was the fear of meeting serious resistance in this city, because in March 1979 a major uprising took place there, supported by the local garrison and led to the death of thousands of people. The information received by the “long-range” about the location and forces of the enemy was not certain: “A dozen of them or a whole division, whether they are sitting in the house or holding a rally on urban square - no one knew anything about this, ”recalled the commander-in-chief of YES V.V. Reshetnikov. As a result, the raid did not take place. The entry of troops went almost without hindrance.

Despite the growth of hostilities, in the first years of the war, the 40th Army managed with the forces of army and front-line aviation that were at hand. The exception was the appeal for help to the Long-Range Aviation, when it was necessary to strike at the lapis lazuli mines in the northern district of Jarm, which belonged to the possessions of Ahmad Shah. The blatant disregard for the central government and the willfulness of the owner of these places were based, in addition to his personal abilities and the military strength of the rebels, also on the original crafts of these places - prey precious stones. Tangible income from their export strengthened the power of Masud and allowed him to pursue his own policy, supplying his troops well in the tradition of the combination of war and trade adopted in the East. The area, where even in the best of times they did not recognize the central government, did not give rest to Kabul, which now and then made attempts to “feel” the deposits. The next operation to “undermine the Dushman economy” was being prepared for the summer of 1981 - in the tradition of a planned economy, the directives of the USSR Ministry of Defense at the beginning of the year demanded “to free at least 70% of the country’s territory and 80% of county and volost centers from the rebels.” In preparation, reconnaissance discovered a field airfield near the village of Sarnsang, from which the stones were taken to Pakistan. Mi-8s of the Soviet border troops from Gulkhana were sent to this area, but the mines were well guarded, and the helicopters came across an unprecedented dense anti-aircraft fire. Not reaching the goal, they turned back, bringing an impressive set of holes. The next step was preparing a raid by an entire helicopter squadron from Faizabad, but the work was forbidden from the headquarters of the Air Force of the 40th Army, considering it too risky.

They decided to destroy the mines by bombardment, but TurkVO Jarm separated from the airfields of the 40th Army and the border bases solid distance. It was not easy for the MiG-21 and Su-17 pilots, who had rather modest aiming and navigation equipment, to search for a target lost among glaciers and mountain ranges (a year earlier, a group of Chirchik MiG-21s on the route was so “blown away” by jet streams that they almost evaded 100 km and sat down in Bagram literally on the last liters of fuel). The strike was entrusted to the Long-Range Aviation, and on June 10, a heavy bomber squadron worked on Jarm. Bombing was carried out from heights of 10-12 thousand meters, not so much for fear of fire from the ground, but for security flying over the mountains, reaching here heights of 5-6.5 thousand meters (the goal itself lay at the foot of the "mark 6729 m" - the highest peak of the Afghan Hindu Kush). It was not possible to clearly establish the effectiveness of the strike, but it is known that even before that, lapis lazuli was mined there in an explosive way ...

FAB-1500 dropped in the Kandahar area. It is clearly seen that the aiming mark lies away from the duvals, on the border of the sands near the Dori River

DA again appeared over Afghanistan during the large-scale Panjshir operation of 1984. For the previous two years, a truce was in effect with Massoud, according to which the 40th Army even undertook to provide him with "air and artillery support in the event of armed clashes between his detachments and rival formations." The promise "not to inflict air strikes on the Panjshir" was specifically stipulated. Personal work with Ahmad Shah was carried out by a lieutenant colonel of the GRU sent to him, "acquainting him with the Soviet way of life and the works of the classics of Marxism." However, the peace was unsteady: the growing influence of the “Panjshir lion” aroused the jealousy not only of Kabul, but also of the numerous advisory apparatus, which justified its role by the war. To get rid of this “splinter”, one of the high-ranking KGB officers, who was not accustomed to exchanging for trifles, proposed drastic measures: power". The latter implied not only participation in the leadership of the operation by the Minister of Defense S. L. Sokolov himself, but also an unprecedented large-scale involvement of aviation.

In addition to the Air Force 40th A, four regiments of the FA from border airfields were involved in the raids, and the use of ammunition of the largest calibers required the participation of "long rangers". In early April, a squadron of the Bobruisk 200th Guards TBAP was relocated to Khanabad on Tu-16s, capable of delivering 9 tons of bombs to the target at once, including three-, five- and nine-ton bombs. Six Tu-22M2s from the 1225th TBAP from the Trans-Baikal Belaya airfield under the command of the deputy flew to the Mary-2 base. commander of the regiment p / p-ka V. Galanin. The amount of work to be done was obvious: the warehouses could not accommodate all the ammunition brought in, and everywhere - at the parking lots, between the runway and the "taxiing" bombs of various types and calibers were piled up. All these stocks were to be dumped on Panjshir, where intelligence estimated the number of Masud's detachments by April 1984 at 3,500 fighters. In other words, for every 12-15 enemy men, there was one Soviet aircraft or helicopter.

At 4.00 on April 19, the bombers went to the target. Tu-16s went up first, then Tu-22M2s, half an hour later 60 Su-24s followed them. The concentration of aircraft in the sky over Panjshir was such that it was recommended that the "sides" approaching the impact site turn on the RSBN only from the near line, otherwise the station in Bagram, which had a capacity of 100 cars, would "choke" (higher density is not found in the capital's airports). So that the pilots could better navigate over unfamiliar terrain, they mounted "beacons" for airborne radars ahead of time - trusses with corner reflectors of the type that stood at the training grounds. "Rangers" entered the targets above the rest, dropping bombs from 9000-10000 m through dense clouds. Particularly impressive were the strikes of the “twos”: each of the machines carried 64 OFAB-250-270s, which fell out in a series from a horizontal flight, after which tens of hectares below boiled up with a continuous carpet of tears. To maintain alignment, the bomb rack locks were opened in a certain order: in pairs on the left and right, front and rear.

Tu-22M2 was the first of the Backfire family to appear over Afghanistan

Massed strikes continued for the first three days of the operation, but the "carcasses" from Khanabad and Mary carried out only one sortie in the morning - after it, the targets were covered with a dusty veil, and for stealth, the Long-Range Aviation combat work was ordered to be carried out at dusk. This limited the participation of YES in the operation. Already in May cars left the border airfields.

The effectiveness of high-altitude bombing was low. One of the reasons for this was the unsuitable nature of the ammunition used. The heavy land mines shaking the ground did not achieve a result: the few barriers on the path of the troops identified by reconnaissance did not linger in one place, leaving the blows in time. The bombs themselves of calibers of 3000, 5000 and 9000 kg did not at all correspond to the tasks of combating manpower and even destroying buildings - when they were created, they were not intended to be used against ground targets at all! Heavy FABs appeared at the end of the forties as the only means of dealing with large ships at that time and have since remained in service, although the characteristics of their damaging effect on other objects were not even evaluated (the exception was the “one and a half”, which were considered acceptable for strikes against industrial facilities, dams and underground structures). Even during the bombardment of "enemy villages", which completely swept away houses and duvals, the real effect was small. The power of impressive-looking bombs was wasted: the lethal radius of the FAB-3000 shock wave did not exceed 39 m, and even for the FAB-9000 remained within 57 m. The enemy received incapacitating concussions with bleeding from the nose and ears, respectively, at 158 ​​and 225 m around - the result, inferior to a series of bombs of "front-line caliber", aimed dropped from an attack aircraft. Despite all this, for several sorties, infrequent in the practice of "long-range", the commanders of both groups received the Order of the Red Banner of Battle.

Despite their advanced age, Tu-16s from the 251st Guards TBDP successfully passed the Afghan exam

The emblem on board one of the "Afghans" of the 251st Guards TBAP

The Afghan campaign is usually compared to the Vietnam War. A parallel arises in the assessment of the work of Long-Range Aviation. History repeated itself: starting with the use of links of attack aircraft and fighters, the US Air Force was drawn into an endless chain of increasing strikes, and a year later they involved strategic aviation in the business, trying to solve all problems with a tonnage of bombs. Nevertheless, with all the apparent similarity, fundamental differences should be taken into account. The OKSV was five times smaller than the American forces in Vietnam, the hostilities were of a much smaller scale, and, accordingly, the Air Force of the 40th Army, even with the units involved, was an order of magnitude inferior to the thousands of US aviation armada. North of the 16th parallel, the United States still dealt with the state, including enterprises, warehouses, transport nodes with bridges, stations and ports - the usual large targets for bombardment. Even in the South, where rampant carpet bombing was practiced, the goal was a network of roads along which reinforcements and weapons were moved.

These recipes were not suitable for the fight against a scattered and small enemy, as was the case in a purely counter-guerrilla Afghan war. Accordingly, the participation of Long-Range Aviation in it remained episodic. The enemy carried everything necessary with him, without needing the provided military science reliance on infrastructure - fortifications, warehouses, headquarters and barracks, habitually searched for by intelligence. Even the fortresses and caves that have been preserved since ancient times, which could serve as a haven for the Mujahideen and looked like a “reliable target”, were immediately left by fighters accustomed to nomadism, dissolving in the mountains and greenery. When ambushes on roads and in villages caused the greatest damage, the power of the bombers was not used.

took shape awkward situation: the enemy continued to gain strength, expanding the sphere of influence, but was not suitable for overly powerful aircraft, which literally did not notice the enemy. This fully applied to the results of the "Big Panjshir" in 1984. Although the then commander of the 40th Army, General Lt. L.E. Generalov, called it "an example of the largest and most effective operation", real successes were more than modest . The Panjshir had to be abandoned, and the detachments that had escaped heavy losses and Masud himself returned to it. The conclusion of GlavPUR read: “Experience confirmed the low efficiency conducting major military operations precisely from a military point of view, and sometimes their political damage. As for the bombing strikes, the infantry spoke out even more clearly, reproaching the aviators that they "eat their chocolate for nothing."

And yet, in the summer of 1986, long-range aviation was again involved in work on Afghanistan: the very presence of such powerful force required its use. In those months, a widely declared withdrawal of a part of the OKSV was being prepared, during which 6 regiments were to leave the country (however, the army was replenished in parallel), and long-range bombers were to prevent the movement of dushmans and shelling of the departing columns. In addition, a number of operations were planned in the south that needed air support. By this time, in addition to the usual hostilities to "cleanse" the provinces and return them to the rule of Kabul - an occupation as regular as hopeless - attacks on bases and base areas, on which the "regiments" and "fronts" began to rely, came into use. , uniting the former disparate gangs under the command of large field commanders. There were bases that served as a support for one formation, transshipment bases and points from which weapons were shipped and caravans were sent, and large base areas, which included headquarters, warehouses, weapons and ammunition workshops, communication centers and training centers. Hard-to-reach gorges, lost in the mountains, served as places for them.

Characterizing qualitative changes, an analytical note by the Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Forces back in October 1984 drew attention to the appearance of objects that "the rebels are preparing for a stubborn defense in engineering terms." Aviation became the most reliable means of defeating them. However, the "pin pricks" of the Air Force 40th A, forced to operate at a considerable distance from the bases, did not give due success: at such a distance, Bagram's fighters and attack aircraft could, at best, deliver a couple of bombs, and due to supply difficulties from time to time. At that time, the headquarters was even forced to impose restrictions, obliging them to hang only one bomb at a time! (However, by that time the entire combat load was usually dropped in the first run, and the result of the strike depended more on its accuracy than on the number of bombs.) besides, the high-explosive power of the “five hundred” limiting for them was not enough to destroy shelters, often carved into solid rock or filled with concrete. It is curious that even sappers failed to blow up some caves - the laid charges could not bring down the vaults, and the explosions only “cleaned out” them as if under a whisk. Protected targets required proper measures of influence, and here those same large-caliber bombs turned out to be suitable. A high-explosive blow from above caused tremors, cracking and collapse of the stone that filled the caves, and landslides covered their entrances. Bombing on the slopes had an impressive effect: the descent of hundreds of tons of stones buried the mouths of the caves and approaches to them, cornices fell to the bottom of the gorges, a few roads and paths rested on heaps of rocky blocks, and the enemy had to spend weeks searching for workarounds. To power of the explosion was not wasted on the surface, the fuses were set to work with a slowdown that allowed the bomb to deepen and explode in the thickness of the mountain. Usually used electric fuses AVU-E and AV-139E, specially designed for large-caliber bombs and high-altitude bombing. They were distinguished by increased safety - the final cocking took place only 18-23 s after separation from the aircraft. , The use of special thick-walled FAB-1500-2600TS turned out to be especially beneficial. Despite the “one-and-a-half” caliber, they had a real mass of more than 2.5 tons, and a strong cast “head” of ten centimeters thickness (versus the 18-mm walls of the usual FAB-1500), like a ram, made it possible to go deep into the rock. Thus, 469 kg of its contents gave a greater effect than 675 kg of explosives of the “one and a half” types M-46 and M-54 (besides, the TGAS-5 TNT hexogen, which filled the Teeska, had one and a half equivalent compared to TNT in other large-caliber bombs) . The three-ton bombs of the M-46 and M-54 models contained 1400 and 1387 kg of TNT each, the five-ton FAB-5000M-54 - 2207.6 kg, and the nine-ton FAB-9000M-54 - 4297 kg. By the mid-80s, ammunition of the 1950 model had already been removed from service, as well as armor-piercing monsters BrAB-3000 and -6000, which could be useful here.

Tu-22M3 from the 185th Guards TBAP strike FAB-3000M54

The commander of the detachment of the 185th Guards TBDP, Mr. V.I. Bandyukov, in the cockpit of his "Backfire". Mary-2, November 1988. Each star aboard long-range bombers meant a sortie

Tu-16s of the 251st Guards took part in the raids. Red Banner TBAP, relocated to Mary from Bila Tserkva. In those summer months, such a virtue of YES was clearly manifested as independence from “seasonal” problems, due to which the combat load of FA aircraft depended not so much on the task as on the season. The heat sometimes did not even allow to tear off the "overloaded" pair of bombs car from the ground - a fresh (June) confirmation of this was the "decomposed" Su-17 on takeoff in Bagram. And the Tu-16 with bomb bays loaded to the eyeballs and with half refueling could easily cover the entire territory of Afghanistan. Anti-aircraft fire for the "long-range" bombers from a height did not pose a threat, but the appearance of the latest F-16s in Pakistan, which had already managed to "mark" an attack in May by two Afghan aircraft, inspired fear.

Therefore, the Tu-16 sorties were covered by the MiG-21bis of the 115th Guards IAP from Kokaity, with which the only incident in the entire “arrival” turned out to be connected. The stern gunner of one of the "carcasses", ensign N. Slipchuk, known in the regiment as a romantic and a poet, suddenly mistook the fighters chasing them for the enemy and, without hesitation, opened fire. The firing lasted half a minute, which was enough to land the entire ammunition load of 1000 shells in one long burst. The fighters shied away from the tracks, but the training of the shooter, fortunately, left much to be desired, and all the damage was reduced to the replacement of “shot” cannon barrels (the queue, which is normal for overheating and wear, should not exceed 200-300 rounds).

The most extensive was the use of long-range aviation "before the curtain", in the last months of the war. They turned to the “long-range” for help in October 1988, with the beginning of the final stage of the withdrawal of troops, when the enemy’s actions were expected to intensify: in the end, many opposition leaders threatened with especially painful blows, not only in the usual manner of hitting in the back, but also scoring points in anticipation of future struggle for power. Other leaders saw in the departure of the Soviet troops an opportunity to “deal with” Kabul without interference, and at the same time resolve contradictions among themselves, and they willingly signed “non-aggression pacts” with the 40th Army. the word "rebels", which confirmed the well-known: "The rebellion cannot end in success - otherwise it is called differently." Peace agreements with the Mujahideen, in which the leadership of the OKSV had a certain experience, made it possible to withdraw troops without hindrance, but the way home was seen differently "from above". Nevertheless, the position of the headquarters of General B.V. Gromov and the leadership of the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, headed by General of the Army V.I. Varennikov, had a tangible effect on the organization of the withdrawal and the work of the involved aviation forces.

By the fall of 1988, part of the Air Force of the 40th Army (up to 45%) had already left the DRA. To compensate, along with other forces, by the end of October, a separate long-range aviation group was formed, seconded to the SAVO Air Force (TurkVO had been liquidated by this time, but the headquarters of the united district and the Air Force command post were located in Tashkent). The main task of the group was to cover the withdrawn units and places of deployment with preemptive strikes on the areas of deployment of opposition fire weapons, as well as disrupting the shelling of large cities, attacking bases and warehouses, supporting Afghan troops in blockaded garrisons, designed to "eliminate political deformations in the abandoned areas of the country" .

FAB-1500 are torn in green

The group included aircraft and crews of the DA Guards units: a Tu-16 squadron of the 251st Guards TBAP from Belaya Tserkov and two Tu-22M3 squadrons from the Poltava 185th Guards TBAP. They were placed at two nearby airfields Mary-1 and Mary-2 - the only free ones. time, even if they lie farther from the target, than the border bases (for the "long-distance" the difference of 200-300 km was not significant). In Mary-1, where she was. The 1521st airbase of MiG-23 and MiG-29 fighters, "playing along" for the enemy in the training of IA pilots, deployed 11 Tu-16s - three detachments and two cars control groups. On the other side of the runway, there was a local airport, which was another reason for the division of the Long-Range Aviation group: Mary-1 was used to receive "transport workers" with troops withdrawing, UN representatives were invited there, and the menacing-looking Backfires did not fit well into the ideas of Western diplomats about implementation of the Geneva Accords. Tu-16s, day after day, methodically taxiing to the start, attracted less attention, being engaged in "planned combat training."

The "carcasses" from Belaya Tserkov were of considerable age - almost all of them began their service in the early sixties and were the same age as their pilots. Unlike the 40th A sent to the Air Force, which they tried to select according to qualifications of at least 1-2 classes, the method of work of the "long-range" made it possible to attract almost the entire flight crew, bypassing any special training. The same applied to machines that had not undergone any modifications: in order to “take and throw”, the capabilities of a long-range aviation veteran were quite enough. By 1988, Tu-16s were the only aircraft capable of carrying the FAB-9000, and this advantage was finally in demand. It was not without problems: at home, no one had to deal with monster bombs, for the placement of which in cargo bay a whole structure was mounted - a bridge holder BD-6 with massive beams and struts. The transportation of the "nine-ton" required a personal transport - a BT-6 trolley, which could be moved by the efforts of several dozen people. The unaccustomed bulky equipment during one of the first attempts to hang the bomb led to someone that the FAB-9000, which had gone skewed, got stuck in the compartment and almost fell down. The gunsmiths rushed in all directions and only the second time they managed to put the recalcitrant bomb in place. "Nine-tons" were the main cargo, but from time to time bombs of smaller calibers were also used, up to the "placer" FAB-250, which were taken at 24. Such differences in loading were explained not so much by tactical necessity as by breaks in the supply, which "cleaned up" warehouses countrywide.

Many targets lay in the vicinity of Kandahar and Jalalabad, already abandoned by the Soviet troops. The bombardments here were in the nature of a counterbalance to incessant shelling and sorties, all the more so as to hope for active actions there were no government garrisons. This also affected the nature of the work of the "long-range", for the most part, did not imagine the objects of strikes, distinguishing them only geographically. Upon returning to questions about what targets were bombed, they got off with the words: "Those that indicated."

Flights to the "far corners" took 3.5-4 hours. In view of the fact that they had to work near the Pakistani border itself, and there was no need to rely on their own weapons and means of passive defense (Tu-16s were not equipped with IR traps, which are mandatory in the Afghan sky, having only “seeders” of dipole ribbons for radar interference), each the departure was accompanied by fighter cover, and due to the duration of the raids, the escort was replaceable. The neighboring MiG-29s escorted and met the group, sometimes the duty link of the Su-17MZ from Mary-2 was involved for this. Confirming their partly fighter mission, the Su-17s carried a pair of R-60 missiles and PTB-800 tanks, which made it possible to escort bombers over the north of the DRA. Closer to the target, the baton was taken over by the MiG-23MLD from the 120th IAP in Bagram.

One detachment of three Tu-16s was constantly sent to the bombardment. Departures were usually scheduled in the morning, and they went to the target without using the RBP-4 radio sight, “blind-sighted” and useless over the mountains, where there were no clear radar reference points (a thirty-year-old device was theoretically capable of detecting objects from 150-180 km, but only if they stood out well against the background of the area, and were suitable, as they said, "to notice the skyscrapers and the Statue of Liberty"). On the route, they managed with navigation crew using ARC-5 and DISS " track”, the flight mode was also almost constant: an altitude of 10-11 thousand meters and a speed of 850 km / h. With access to the target, the bombing was carried out by the navigator, who used the optical sight OPB-11R.

Sometimes the Tu-16 was involved in night strikes, while the area was illuminated by SAB from the Su-17. Once, helicopters were sent to control the results of the strike, but they did not find any traces of the target - a powerful collapse buried not only the object itself, but also the entire former relief. Another time, paratroopers flew out to “clean up” the bombing area in the green zone. Upon their return, they reported: "You fought off the desire to fight there for a long time." There were some mistakes - the inevitable satellites of high-altitude bombing, in which dispersion of the order of 300-500 m was considered normal: the explosions of the "nine-ton" lay too close to the checkpoint near Kabul and led to contusions of the fighters on duty there, some of whom lost their hearing. In just three months of Tu-16 operation, 289 FAB-9000M-54 bombs were dropped. For the pilots themselves, the “cover” and the flight altitude, which made it possible not to be afraid of fire from the ground, inspired confidence and made sorties a routine matter. The work was facilitated by the organization of its “rotational method”: from time to time, part of the crews flew home to rest, and others replaced them, so that their participation in the war was limited to 15-20 sorties. Trouble delivered themselves "not very new" cars, on which minor failures and breakdowns constantly occurred, which is why aircraft were involved in sorties as they were in good condition. To the credit of the old but strong Tu-16, even with failures in the air, it was possible to complete the task, and the crews tried to eliminate malfunctions right in flight (the dignity of the “old” and not very complex equipment). The cabin of the “carcass” made it possible to get to many units and shelves of equipment, in all corners, just in case, all kinds of small spare parts, fasteners, clamps, locks, etc. were piled up, and the crew members shoved screwdrivers and pliers into their pockets.

Even a serious incident that happened in January 1989 with the Tu-16 of Dr. E. Pomorov did not prevent reaching the goal. On the plane carrying the FAB-9000, at an altitude of 10100 m, the nasal blister was torn off. A furious whirlwind burst into the cockpit of the bomber, which was moving at a speed of 850 km / h. Inside, the temperature dropped to the outboard - 50 ° C, and a rarefaction hit my ears. Worst of all was the navigator, Mr. Lylov, who found himself right under the freezing stream. It only remained to thank the fur flight jackets and headsets with retro goggles, which were preserved in the outfit of the Tu-16 crews. In the event of a depressurization, the instruction prescribed an immediate descent, but only 15 minutes remained to the target, and the commander continued to keep the aircraft at flight level and heading. The crew bombed, although not particularly accurately (under the wind raging in the cockpit, it was not up to it) and safely reached home. For this flight, Mr. Pomorov received the Order of the Red Star, and the rest of the crew received medals "For Military Merit".

Tu-22MZ of the Poltava regiment settled in Mary-2, where the 156th APIB was based on the Su-17MZ, which at that time received a respite from almost continuous work in the Afghan campaign. The involvement of Poltava residents for the combat debut of new bombers was justified by the fact that the 185th Guards TBAP was a leader in the development cars and had the greatest experience in its operation, including flights to distant ranges with practical bombing. The appearance of "troikas" meant a qualitatively new level of the "Afghan" Air Force grouping. The new vehicles had a perfect NK-45 navigation system and sighting and navigation equipment, which gave accurate access to targets and bombing, high-quality radio communications equipment and an impressive range of combat payloads. Although the cargo compartment of the Tu-22M3 was not designed for bombs larger than three tons, the total weight of the cargo could reach 24 tons. For work from Mary, more moderate options were chosen, not exceeding 12 tons, for reasons of maintaining “volatility”.

FAB-1500 and FAB-3000 are ready for suspension on aircraft

On October 28, two squadrons of 8 aircraft each flew to Mary-2 from Poltava, together with the leadership of the regiment - commander Colonel V.I. Nikitin, his deputies p / p-kami Parshin and Androsov and regiment navigator A.N. The squadrons led the commander-1 p / p-k R.N. Saberov and the commander-2p / p-k I.P. Degterev. among them were aircraft not yet equipped with IR traps, two Tu-22MZ of the latest series were borrowed from the 402nd TBAP from Orsha. With the help of the Il-76 and An-12, the technical staff, the necessary equipment and replacement pilots were transferred to Mary (in total, 21 crews were involved in the work).

Already on October 31, the first flight took place. As in the next two, the targets were located near Kandahar - in the mountain range in the north and "green" in the south along the Dori River, where there were detachments blocking the roads to the city. On November 3, bombs fell in the vicinity of the Kandahar air base, from where it was shelled. The next day, the target was the town of Jalez, which lay in advantageous for dushmans, the place is a gorge with access directly to Kabul. From the nearest mountains, a panorama of the capital opened, and a route to the south passed nearby.

For the next week, bombardments were carried out in the northeastern sector around Kabul, where launchers were concentrated, showering missiles on the city. A rare day went by without shelling - Kabul remained the center of the aspirations of detachments of the most diverse affiliation, not only for tactical reasons, but more as a means of expressing themselves. It was a matter of prestige to bombard the capital, firing at least a few shells in its direction. At first, the harassing fire did not cause much harm, but gradually gained strength: if in 1987 147 rockets fell in the city, killing 14 residents, then in 1988 the number of rockets increased to 635, and victims - to 233. Even unaimed launches sooner or they found targets late: on June 26, 1988, the hit of one missile on the Kabul airport turned the Su-25 parking lot into a bonfire, leaving only fragments of 8 attack aircraft. On November 14, to the accompaniment of explosions, a Tu-154 with a Soviet government commission had to take off, the same shelling hit the residential module of the 50th OSAP aviators, burying 11 people in it.

To answer, they attracted "long-distance" people, who flew out on alarm in half an hour. After the evening bombardment, strikes on the "dushman ring" around Kabul continued for the next two weeks, falling mainly on the surrounding mountain plateaus and ridges, from where launches were noted from checkpoints, as well as on reconnoitered warehouses and storage facilities for missiles. The hunt for missilemen was not very successful: launchers often stood on cars and immediately changed positions, even more often primitive disposable guides with a clockwork were used. As a result of all the work of the 185th regiment, the reconnaissance department of the 40th Army attributed only 6 vehicles, 4 launchers and 340 rockets to its account.

Tu-22MZ from the 185th Guards TBDP leave the Mary-2 airfield for a combat mission

At the end of November, they carried out two sorties on targets near Fayzabad, which stood out against the general background - the mines of lapis lazuli and emeralds in the possessions of Masud were again bombarded (by the way, these targets were the only ones that can hardly be attributed to the stipulated combat charter of the Long-Range Aviation as "operational and strategic reserves": he simply did not provide for all the others). The outskirts of Kabul were processed day by day by local aviation. Once, the departures of the YES and the Bagram attack aircraft coincided in time and place, and already on the combat course, a Su-25 circling below was suddenly found in the sight of one of the bombers. They managed to drive him away by radio, because close bursts of powerful bombs could hit the “rook”, if not with a shock wave, then with fragments that flew up to a two-kilometer height and “floated” in the air for almost a minute.

After several bombardments using the FAB-500, they were abandoned, switching to a larger caliber, which made it possible to more fully use the capabilities of the machines (another reason was the troublesome equipment and suspension of hundreds of such bombs in each shift). Typical options there were two FAB-3000s or eight FAB-1500s, while the group heading for the same target was trying to load the same type so that the difference in the suspension would not make it difficult to fly in formation. Some of the bombs were equipped with special fuses AVPZ for mining with self-destruction within 6 days. One and a half and three-ton "mines" were laid in areas of enemy activity, and to defuse them (there were cases when dushmans themselves used unexploded bombs in quality land mines) did not give a trap that reacted to an attempt to unscrew the fuse or pull the bomb. The unnecessary external multi-lock MBDZ-U9-68s were immediately removed from the aircraft, although the rocket pylons continued to remain under the wings for another month (it was difficult to dismantle them, and it was simply impossible to get their hands on everyday work).

The regiment's control group, participating in combat sorties, managed to establish effective work. In the evening, on a call from Tashkent, they sorted out maps, and the crews were already ready to receive a combat order. The planes were waiting for them fully equipped, immediately after the previous flight, they received a “duty” charge of bombs and a refueling of 40 tons of kerosene, which allowed them to work on any targets. The formation of a battle order and approach to the target worked out "on foot in flight", painting them with chalk on the asphalt. In flight, they used maps of a 10-km scale, and over the impact site they were guided by more detailed “two-kilometer” and “half-kilometer”, having carefully studied each hill on the tablet ahead of time. The sorties were carried out by the forces of the eight Tu-22MZ. Targets were also assigned by squadron, sometimes divided into fours and pairs. Usually they were grouped and were located 500-1000 m from one another. Sometimes two squadrons were sent to strike at once. The planes leaving for the mission taxied out all at once, lining up before the start and starting the takeoff run immediately after the leader took off. This achieved a quick take-off, after which, already at the turn around the airfield, the group gathered in close formation and went to the target in a column of pairs with a 150-m excess of the slaves, a 10-second interval between pairs and a 40-second interval between links.

The route was kept at a speed of 900 km / h, at first at an altitude of 7200-7800 m. After warning about the danger of MANPADS launches from mountain peaks, the echelons were raised to 9000-9600 m, paving the way around the high peaks. The danger was not exaggerated: a year earlier, the defeat of the Su-17M3R MANPADS, which was flying at an altitude of 7000 m, was noted, and the launch from the top was confirmed by a KhAD agent who was in the gang. Immediately after the start of work, the “long-range” themselves observed the launch. To R. Saberov, he was remembered as “a dusty cloud on a slope, a trickle of disturbed air upwards and a flash of a rocket that went into self-destruction.”

Departures began every day according to plan, at 10 o'clock in the morning, but the crews began to notice columns of smoke rising along the way, apparently warning the enemy. The time began to change, but most flights remained daytime. The flight to a distance of 800-1000 km passed without any problems: the NK-45 navigation system with the TsVM-10TS-45 digital machine provided access to the target with an accuracy of about hundreds of meters, and automation the on-board control system was able to guide the aircraft along the route and land it. The work of the navigator was simplified by the continuous indication of the position on the movable map of the PA-3 tablet. With an exit to the designated square, the entire crew joined in to help the navigator-operator, looking for a target. To attack, the group scattered, and each aimed individually using the OPB-15T television sight, which gave a high-resolution picture. At the same time, the control of the aircraft passed to the navigator, and the reset followed in automatic mode. The accuracy of bombing was impressive: sometimes, on a dare, navigators placed bombs in a separate building or duval. More often, however, gaps were covered specified square. The pilots were not particularly inclined to understand the type of target - they received tasks and did the work, and the dusty mushrooms of explosions swelled equally among the dashes of the duvals, on the roads and near the deserted dunes. To the questions of a capital correspondent who looked into Mary, who inquired about the sensations during the bombing, the pilots got off with the words: “If something goes wrong, it’s none of our business, as they say, the Motherland ordered,” or even frankly sent him away.

The commander of the YA, General Lieutenant P.S. Deinekin (right) inspects the work of his subordinates. Mary-2, November 1988

Gunsmiths of the 185th TBAP are preparing for the suspension of the FAB-1500

Bombs were regularly dropped, even if not a single village was visible for many kilometers around in the indicated areas, only mountains and desert floated in the sights. It is doubtful that such an expenditure of ammunition was due to reconnaissance misses - there were also no targets on the photographic plates. One of the motivations for such strikes was their warning nature for the surrounding population: the earth leaving from under their feet and crumbling rocks clearly showed what awaited the especially restless. According to rumors, the headquarters of the 40th A, obeying the orders dictated by big politics "from above" not to stop the bombing, thus nevertheless diverted strikes from the "contractual" villages and groups. Most likely, this also applied to Massoud, who conscientiously observed the terms of the truce. Already after the war, Lieutenant-General Gromov uttered at first glance surprising words: “Even during periods of tough confrontation ... we did not seek to break his gangs, but to physically destroy Ahmad Shah himself.” However, everything is logical: after the defeat of the “Panjshir lion” detachments, their place would be taken by the “irreconcilable” formations.

The war still continued, and the necessary tactical measures were taken: approaching the target for surprise was built a little to the side, then 4-5 minutes from the reset point they sharply turned, getting rid of cargo in one run. Without stopping over the place of impact, they closed the formation on the retreat and at once increased their speed, heading for Termez. They usually went back on the afterburner, accelerating to M = 1.7, and many noted with satisfaction that “only in the war did they manage to fly enough on supersonic sound” (at home it was not always possible to break the sound barrier and at an altitude not lower than 11000 m). The fighter cover, which accompanied the group in all sorties, did not keep pace with the Tu-22MZ. The MiG-23s carrying the tank and missiles had speed limits and could not keep up with the "long-range" ones, because of which one could hear the requests of the "cover" on the air: "Big, don't drive the horses, I'm behind!"

Tu-22PD jammers were also in combat formations, supplementing the work of their own airborne defense systems of the "troikas". Three Tu-22PDs from the 341st TBAP under the command of the p / p-ka V. Melnik, attached to the Long-Range Aviation Group, were based together with the Poltava residents. Their task was to disrupt possible launches of Pakistani missiles by the Krotal air defense system and, especially, F-16 attacks. When working near the border, this danger had to be taken into account, since after the drop it was necessary to carry out photo control of the results with on-board AFA-42/20 and 42/100, for which the aircraft had to be kept on a straight line for at least a minute, and the extra 15-20 km were taken to the "ribbon" itself. The tension in the cockpit was added by the sensitive SPO-15 Bereza, which continually reacted with an alarming squeak to everything in a row, whether it was the work of the PNA of neighboring aircraft, the radiation of the "cover" sights or the powerful interference of the "shumoviks".

The use of IR traps by "long rangers" differed from the accepted methodology of the FA, where the pilots immediately turned off the shooting when they left the attack. Tu-22MZ, on the move away from the target, began to pour LO-43 kilogram traps (each carrying 48 rounds), and the trailing guns opened fire from the stern guns with special projectiles from the PRLS with dipole "noodles" and radiating heat from the PICS. The shells, however, were soon abandoned, saving time on stuffing tapes and the troublesome replacement of cartridge boxes, which had to be hoisted to a height of five meters. Pakistani fighters already had little chance of attacking recruiters. speed“troikas”, and a train of blazing balls and tracks served as a barrier against launches in pursuit.

“Just for every fireman”, the pilots were given AKS-74U, grenades and a couple of pistols to fly, and instead of soldering and a useless rescue boat, jars of water and magazines for weapons were placed in the ejection seats moved by NAZ (as they joked, “for a complete set, there is only enough robes and skullcaps). Even on the way to the airfield, the pilots were each time accompanied by a submachine gunner to protect themselves from possible sabotage. The precautionary measure was not superfluous: in neighboring Karshi, a Tajik soldier was detained at the airfield, unscrewing fuses from bombs in order to help fellow believers.

On the Tu-22MZ (board 74) from the 132nd TBAP, several sorties were carried out by Gen.-Mr. D.M.Dudaev

In the end, several sorties were carried out at night, once it was necessary to bomb through dense clouds covering the target. At the same time, in addition to the NK-45 and PNA inertial gyroplatforms, the A-713 automatic long-range navigation system was used, which determined the position from ground-based radio beacons (with its help, the navigation crew was often checked during flights under normal conditions). The system gave high accuracy, “up to a scale”, however, bombing with its help required good teamwork in the crew, where the commander had to perform additional turns on the commands of the navigator, taking into account all the impositions and amendments, and the operator to control. There were few failures, although the "troika" was considered rather capricious machine, mainly in terms of complex electrical equipment and electronics. Once, due to a drop in oil pressure, I had to turn off the engine on Mr. P. Androsov's plane and return on the remaining one. Another time, an airplane landing in a dust storm (the famous "Afghan") began to be blown away by the wind, and the pilot "attached" the car on the runway with a double overload.

The “extreme” sorties, which fell on December 3, 4 and 5, were carried out near Kandahar by Poltava: the airfields of the Air Force of the 40th Army were closed due to the weather, and the Afghan garrison requested urgent assistance. As a result of the trip, the commander of the 185th Guards TBAP V. Nikitin, who completed a dozen and a half sorties, received the Order of the Red Banner of War, the same awards were presented to A. Libenkov and both commanders - R. Saberov and I. Degterev. The crew commanders and pilots were awarded the Orders of the Red Star, the share of the navigators was allocated "For military merit".

In the raid on December 5, the long-distance fighters from Orsha, who arrived to replace the Poltava, took part, and on December 7, the entire volume of combat work fell on the crews and vehicles of the 402nd TBAP, commanded by p / p-k Yanin. The group from Orsha consisted of the same two squadrons of 8 Tu-22MZ and one more spare aircraft to maintain the order of forces in case of failures and breakdowns. It also included two bombers lent to the Poltava residents, who had to work out a second term (on one of them, 35 sorties were completed in total - the largest number among all the “troikas”).

The 402nd TBAP continued the same work, the “geography” of the targets also changed little. At the same time, winter bad weather led to more frequent use of "blind" bombing methods. Most reliable there was a bombardment with the help of the navigation system, which, using the data of the radar operating in the review mode, issued the “Thunder” command at the right time - a signal to reset. Gradually, sorties were increasingly carried out at night, inflicting harassing blows. At the same time, the situation did not allow the use of the PNA radar associated with the NK-45 for bombing: the snow-covered mountains looked “smooth”, there were no large buildings, bridges or clusters of equipment among the targets. Sometimes a drop was practiced along a remote radar reference if there was a characteristic contrasting object nearby (usually they were the bend of the river or the Surubi and Darunt dams east of Kabul), according to which the heading angle and range were specified. Several times near Kabul they tried to bomb on the teams of gunners who had "balalaikas" - goniometer-range automatic radio beacons. This technique did not give much success due to the low accuracy of the impact. And the very tactics of long-range aviation, which involved dropping cargo in one run, were not suitable for target designation of the ground, when the gunner and pilots understood each other perfectly and corrected their blows.

In almost all sorties, the FAB-3000 was bombed, only once making an exception and laying “one and a half” for mining in the mountains. The increased consumption of heavy bombs even forced them to be ordered additionally from industry.

Tu-22M3 worked in tight combat formations

During night sorties, observing the blackout, they turned off the BANO, leaving only dim combat lights visible from above and illuminating the cockpit with a “mouse” - a red light lantern on the starboard side. If there were misses, then no complaints came from remote areas. Only one of the sorties ended in scandal, when during the bombardment near Kandahar in December, one of the dropped bombs fell near the headquarters of the Afghan 2nd Army Corps, and another exploded right in a residential area, killing several dozen people. Governor-General of the province N. Olumi flew in with a complaint, and a joint commission of General V. Afanasyev and Afghan Kadyr arrived in Mary. It was not possible to attribute the incident to the Dushman shelling - fragments of heavy bombs were picked up at the site of the explosions, with which only “long-range bombers” worked there (although “two-ton caliber bombs” that do not exist in service appeared in the case). In the end, the story was hushed up without looking for the guilty, partly because the use of Long-Range Aviation was not advertised and was presented as bombing Afghan aircraft.

In isolated cases, in addition to coordinates and squares, it was specifically said about character goals. On Saturday, January 7, a Su-25 was shot down over the Janez Gorge near Kabul, and the pilot was killed with him (this was the last loss of attack aircraft in the Afghan war). In response, heavy bombs covered the entire area around the crash site. A month later, on February 8, two Afghan crews, taking their families with them, flew on their Mi-8s to Panjshir. The hunt for hijacked helicopters that landed after running out of fuel in one of the gorges lasted three days. The Tu-22MZ was also attracted to it, without much success looking for helicopters through the "windows" in the clouds, but only the Su-25 managed to finally bomb them.

In one of the sorties, right under the formation of the Tu-22MZ, there was a scheduled Boeing, which was heading somewhere to the east. According to the navigator, senior lieutenant S.A. Novikov, “we didn’t think much about all their air corridors, observing only the echelons in height so as not to collide. The Boeing went on its own course, got out right under its nose on the catch-up and slowly floated out on the OPB-15T screen, when the doors of the cargo compartment were already open. It seems that it was an Indian - all decorated, the lights are burning, multi-colored, like on a Christmas tree. Maybe he purposely wanted to take a closer look at the military, but because of him I had to delay with the reset - there were still mountains below, we’ll hit more than one, so a friend.

Tu-22PD jammers covered strike groups during raids on the border areas with Pakistan

However, the "sparing regime" of the bombardment of deserted plains and mountains did not last long. In the central regions, the remaining units of the 40th Army again concentrated near the possessions of Masud, who, according to the report of General Varennikov, nevertheless "categorically forbade his formations to conduct military operations against the Soviet troops, which they strictly observed." However, the top leadership of the USSR openly accused the military of unwillingness to defeat the enemy, after which a strict order to prepare new attack on the Panjshir. Nevertheless, they managed to choose a compromise solution on the spot, and in mid-December, not the positions of Masud and the villages in the valley, but the remote area of ​​\u200b\u200bKoran-o-Munjan with lapis lazuli mines were bombed. But by the New Year, the raids had stopped, and the hint from the air remained half-hearted.

The OKSV had the last step home, and this path led through Charikar and Salang, controlled by the “Panjshir army”. On January 6, the raids resumed, and on the 10th, a Soviet government group flew into Afghanistan, after which an order was received to carry out Operation Typhoon, which became the last chord of the war. Special merit in this belonged to Kabul, according to advisers, "showing indefatigable perseverance" in trying to inflict damage on the enemy with the forces of the outgoing army. Playing politics, Najibullah convinced Moscow of Massoud's intentions to "surrender 14 northern provinces of the country to the Americans" (there were 12 in total).

Tu-22PD from the 341st TBDP two and a half years after the end of the Afghan epic. Ozernoe, 1991

The three-day operation was supposed to begin on January 24, but at the last moment it was ordered "not to delay", and the strikes began a day earlier, and the political workers were tasked with "exposing the criminal position taken by Ahmad Shah." The bombardments also took place on the Panjshir in the previous days, but during the operation they became non-stop. The withdrawal of troops was halted so that artillery and bombers could work unhindered along the roadside areas. The villages also got it, and in those days the bombers were not limited to one sortie per shift. However, the enemy once again left the bombardment. There was, in fact, no return fire, and during the Typhoon, losses were limited to three dead soldiers. From the air it was impossible to assess the successes presented in the reports, but the troops who continued on their way to the pass escorted hundreds of bodies of dead civilians carried to the road.

Long-range aviation continued to work at the same pace, although combat sorties were not counted for pilots, only later in personal files did records appear about "participation in hostilities in the DRA from the territory of the USSR." At the same time, the “bonus” was regularly accrued to the flight crew - 11 rubles determined with accounting accuracy. 78 kop. "for the combat day" on which the work fell out, regardless of the number of sorties. Together with the travel "three rubles", a tangible amount ran up, which amounted to almost one more pay in a month. She was well deserved

Dangerous skies in Afghanistan [Experience in the combat use of Soviet aviation in a local war, 1979–1989] Zhirokhov Mikhail Alexandrovich

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Mikhail Alexandrovich Zhirokhov Dangerous sky of Afghanistan. Experience in the combat use of Soviet aviation in a local war. 1979-1989 Zhirokhov M.A. The dangerous sky of Afghanistan. Experience in the combat use of Soviet aviation in a local war. 1979–1989 - M.: CJSC Publishing house Tsentrpoligraf, 2012.

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Conditions and features of combat operations of ground forces and aviation in Afghanistan Physical and geographical overview The relief of Afghanistan occupies eastern part Iranian plateau, which is the most extensive, dry and desert of the highlands of the Near and Middle East. V

From the book Torpedo bombers in battle. They were called "suicide bombers". author Shirokorad Alexander Borisovich

Use of aviation during the war At the first stage of the war, the combat activity of the aviation group in Afghanistan was seriously affected by shortcomings in the material and technical support of the troops. Often on bare stones, in desert areas, pilots and technicians

From the book The Birth of Soviet Attack Aviation [The History of the Creation of "Flying Tanks", 1926–1941] author Zhirokhov Mikhail Alexandrovich

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Flight performance characteristics of German aircraft purchased abroad for use in Soviet aviation or designed by German designers on instructions from the Soviet government Name: Junkers Yu-13 (Ju 13, F 13). Purpose: passenger. Crew: 2

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Chapter 1. THE CREATION OF THE SOVIET TORPENOBLE AVIATION On August 12, 1915, the British Short-184 float biplane, piloted by Captain 2nd Rank K. Edmons, approached the damaged Turkish transport, which was stranded on the coast of the Sea of ​​​​Marmara. He flew almost

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Good World Evil (Myth)

I remember how, several years ago, I read Viktor Markovsky's articles in a magazine about the use of Soviet military aviation in Afghanistan with pleasure. I still have these magazines and sometimes I re-read them. But the Internet allows us to find them in electronic form. I think these articles will be of interest to people who are fond of military history and military equipment.

HELICOPTERS Mi-8

FIGHTER-BOMBER AVIATION


Already in 1981, the saturation of combat areas with air defense systems reached such proportions that, when planning operations, it was necessary to take into account the need to overcome them. Around the fortified areas and bases of the Mujahideen, there were up to several dozen anti-aircraft firing points. Risk reduction was achieved by the skillful use of the terrain, which ensured the secrecy of the approach and the suddenness of reaching the target, as well as the choice of escape routes after the attack.

As a rule, a pair of Su-17s was the first to appear in the designated area, whose task was additional reconnaissance and target designation with lighting and smoke bombs, which made it easier for the strike group to reach the target. They were piloted by the most experienced pilots who had combat experience and skills in detecting subtle objects. The search for the enemy was carried out at an altitude of 800-1000 m and a speed of 850-900 km / h, taking about 3-5 minutes. Then everything was decided by the speed of the strike, which did not allow the enemy to organize return fire.

In one or two minutes, an air defense suppression group from 2-6 Su-17s entered the target designated by the SAB. From a height of 2000-2500 m, they detected the positions of the DShK and ZGU and, from a dive, struck with NAR S-5, S-8 and RBC-250 or RBC-500 cassettes. The destruction of anti-aircraft points was carried out both by a single aircraft and by a pair - the wingman "finished off" the air defense centers. Not allowing the enemy to come to his senses, after 1-2 minutes, the main strike group appeared above the target, performing an attack on the move. FAB (OFAB) -250 and -500 bombs, S-8 and S-24 missiles fell on the fortifications and rock structures. Reliable and easy to operate, the C-24 had a long range and launch accuracy (especially from a dive) and were used very widely. To combat manpower, cluster munitions RBC-250 and RBC-500 were used. During operations in the "green" and in open places, incendiary tanks with fire mixture were sometimes used. The guns gradually lost their importance - their fire at high speeds and increased heights was ineffective.

FIGHTERS IN AFGHANISTAN

With the advent of the enemy MANPADS, the danger to aviation has increased many times over. At first, the pilots were rescued by the inexperience of the Mujahideen: there were cases when the arrows forgot to connect the power sources (for the most powerful commanders, the one who missed at the same time lost his head), but the development of new weapons took place quickly. The compact and easy-to-handle MANPADS allowed dushmans to organize ambushes on flight routes and near airfields. In order to protect aircraft during takeoff and landing, when the speed and altitude are insufficient to perform an anti-missile maneuver, helicopter patrols were organized within a radius of 3-4 km around the airfield. It is almost impossible to distinguish a shooter with a Stinger from a peaceful peasant from the air, and despite the order in force since 1981 that categorically prohibited attacks on unidentified targets, during the patrol, fire was opened on any suspicious that appeared in the "forbidden zone". The combing of the surroundings did not stop even at night, searching with the help of SAB and night vision devices. In order to reduce the danger, the pilots had to master almost acrobatic tricks. So, “climbing with large gradients” made it possible to reach a safe level, remaining under the cover of circling helicopters. Immediately after lift-off, the aircraft went into a steep upward spiral with a roll and pitch of up to 30°, and in this position "screwed" into the sky. The landing was carried out without the usual "box" around the airfield and required a jewelry calculation, especially when returning from a group mission. The planes entered the airfield across the runway and, one after the other, "fell" down in an even steeper spiral at extremely short intervals. Pilots leveled out on the last turn already above the edge of the runway and, without stopping after the run, they cleared the lane for the cars that landed behind them, walking a few hundred meters away. The landing of the squadron took a matter of minutes. Outside observers froze at this impressive spectacle, and in the cockpits of the MiGs, “Rita” * (* speech informant RI-65) was constantly blaring, warning of the approach of critical flight conditions. The price of reducing combat losses during such landings was an increased accident rate - due to the complexity of the maneuver and high landing speed, the aircraft often did not fit into the alignment of the runway, flew out of it, “take off their shoes” on the run and received damage.

All articles are written by V.Yu.Markovsky.

In the long and fatal war for the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, military aviation was used very widely. Bombing and attacking enemy positions and columns, supporting ground troops, landing troops, evacuating the wounded, delivering passengers and cargo, reconnaissance and mining of the area - the range of tasks facing Soviet pilots was extremely wide, and the effectiveness of their combat work was very high. It is not surprising that planes and helicopters were the most main goal Afghan Mujahideen, who constantly improved their air defense system. The reader will probably be surprised to learn that the combat losses of Soviet aviation amounted to tens and hundreds of pieces of equipment. Many pilots died the death of the brave... The uniqueness of this book is that it was the result of the author's long and painstaking work to collect personal testimonies of military pilots who served in Afghanistan at various times. Based on them, the author analyzes the invaluable experience of using military aviation in a local war.

A series: Military aviation of the 20th century

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by the LitRes company.

DEPLOYMENT OF THE SOVIET AVIATION GROUP

Soviet pilots were involved in the Afghan war, in fact, even before the official start date of December 25, 1979. The fact is that military transport aircraft have been delivering military cargo to all airfields in Afghanistan since 1977.

However, the flights became especially intensive in the fall of 1979. As the adviser to the head of the Signal Corps and the RTO of the Air Force and Air Defense of the DRA (1980-1981), Colonel Valentin Dmitrievich Gerasimenko, recalled, “in October 1979, arrivals of BTA aircraft to the Kabul airfield became more frequent. More often they were Il-76, less often An-22. During the days they flew in several planes and, quickly unloading, flew away. In normal mode, the Kabul airport could receive planes only during the day.

But in October, and especially in November, and at night, ten or even twenty Il-76s landed on Kabul. The planes were released from the cargo and departed before dawn. What they brought “disappeared” from the airport before dawn too.

Foreign correspondents accredited in Kabul tried unsuccessfully to reveal the nature of the night traffic. To answer their many questions, the Afghan Foreign Ministry held press conferences and briefings almost daily, at which, in response to regular questions about the night transportation of Soviet aviation, it answered that a group of transport aircraft of the Civil Air Fleet of the USSR was based in Bagram ("as you gentlemen know") (on On the sides of the An-12 there were indeed Aeroflot identification marks). During the day, according to our requests, they transport various cargoes, and at night they work out what is required for Afghan pilots. learning objectives to acquire the appropriate flight qualification. With mostly night takeoffs and landings, it seems like a lot of planes are coming in.”

At the moment it is not possible to give a general statistics of sorties, I will give a chronicle of the flights of Soviet transport aviation to Afghan airfields for only a few days in March 1979:

And besides, by December 1979 there were aviation units that were based directly on the territory of Afghanistan: for example, a helicopter squadron from the 280th OVP (commander - Lieutenant Colonel Belov) and the 224th separate detachment of the MGA, which consisted of eight An-12s (commander - Colonel Ishmuratov).

Very little is known about these units and the nature of their actions during that period. Having collected scattered information, we can state the following: the “Belov group” itself consisted of servicemen of the 280th OVP of the Army Aviation of the USSR Air Force, which was based at the Kagan airfield. The group was selected on a voluntary basis, the most trained crews, and preference was given to pilots who had experience flying in the Pamirs.

In preparation for the transfer of the squadron to Afghanistan, 12 helicopters painted over the stars and applied the identification marks of the DRA Air Force with homemade stencils. At the same time, the crews changed their regular uniforms to overalls and civilian clothes.

On August 23, 1979, the group took off under its own power from Kagan and landed at the Bagram airbase after five hours of flight. In parallel, for the delivery of technical equipment, 24 flights were made by An-12 transport aircraft and 4 flights by Il-76. Initially, the direct participation of Soviet helicopter pilots in combat operations was assumed, but the chief military adviser (to whom, in fact, the squadron was subordinate) almost immediately introduced a ban on the participation of squadron pilots in hostilities. Moreover, the Soviet crews were even ordered to refrain from returning fire while performing their tasks.

The primary tasks were defined: the delivery of goods, personnel, food to Gardez and Shindand, and most importantly, “government transportation”. One helicopter was constantly on standby to provide possible search and rescue operations. In addition to Bagram, individual crews were periodically on duty in the centers of the provinces and in Kabul.

The Afghan leadership in its own way assessed the work of the transport helicopter squadron and tried to take it also with the transportation of national economic goods. At the same time, as noted by some researchers of the Afghan problem, the squadron has become an instrument in the political and economic game of a large scale. The fact is that the USSR provided military assistance to Afghanistan almost free of charge. However, there were other economic agreements, the legal successor of which was post-revolutionary Afghanistan. Thus, for gas supplies, the USSR owed Afghanistan, according to various estimates, from 270 to 500 million US dollars. But Afghanistan did not go to pay off this debt at the expense of military supplies from the USSR. Afghanistan was offered to buy a batch of Mi-8s through Aviaexport, and it was supposed to pay for the delivered vehicles and spare parts for them. The Afghan leadership refused, having such help as a free Mi-8 squadron with Soviet crews and service. Then the Soviet leadership gave the order to send the squadron home and began to implement the plan. This forced the Afghans to shell out. But even after that, they insisted on using reliable Soviet equipment with even more reliable crews.

It is also worth saying that Soviet pilots at the end of 1979, there was more than enough in Afghanistan: according to intergovernmental agreements, Soviet military specialists were in all Afghan aviation units (up to the squadron level).

Advisors - senior teams of the Air Force and Air Defense of the DRA in the period 1978-1979. worked: Major General of Aviation O.G. Orlov, Major General of Aviation A.G. Arevshetyan, Colonel N.D. Orlov, Colonel N.G. Berdichevsky, Colonel E.I. Mishustin, Major V.A. Pekhotin, Lieutenant Colonel V.D. Stadnichenko, Colonel A.I. Postelnikov.

In addition, in the Main Headquarters of the Air Force and Air Defense of the DRA during this period worked: Major General of Aviation A.A. Egorov, colonels E.N. Kuznetsov, P.M. Kopachev, N.P. Kozin, O.S. Savrasenko, Yu.V. Razuvaev, V.P. Anokhin, I.I. Nesterenko, A.I. Uvarov and others.

Another interesting little known fact: immediately before the entry of the Soviet contingent, Afghan aircraft arrived at the Bagram airfield after a major overhaul, which were overtaken by Soviet crews. It was no coincidence that these pilots lingered - in order to take a direct part in the hostilities.

In early December 1979, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov brought to the leadership General Staff information that in the near future, a political decision may be made to send a group of Soviet troops to Afghanistan in the amount of up to 75 thousand people.

On December 25, 1979, at 18:00 local time, the airlift of units began airborne troops to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram. So, for the transfer of personnel and equipment of the 103rd airborne division and a separate parachute regiment, 343 aircraft flights were made, including 66 An-22 flights, 77 - Il-76 and 200 - An-12. In total, 7,700 personnel, 894 units of military equipment and 1,062 tons of various cargoes were delivered to both airfields.

Here is how, for example, Soviet adviser Colonel Valentin Dmitrievich Gerasimenko described the events at the Kabul airport: “Il-76 planes landed at regular intervals, turned onto taxiways and, while still in motion, lowered the ramps, opened all the hatches. At short stops with the engines running, paratroopers poured out from the inside of the sides and jumped out from 1 to 3 infantry fighting vehicles, artillery pieces and other equipment rolled out. The planes taxied further and, as the runway was liberated, they took off and left for new personnel and equipment.

As for the invasion aviation group, it was created by mid-March 1980, taking into account the deployment and conduct of combat operations by combined arms formations and units in disparate operational areas.

Naturally, the basis for basing aviation units was the airfield network of the Afghan Air Force, which, if necessary, ensured the regrouping of aviation in order to increase its efforts in certain directions.

According to military intelligence, before the introduction of the OKSV, the country's airfield network was as follows: “There are 28 airfields on the territory of Afghanistan, including 9 with capital runways (runways), 8 of them are suitable for basing tactical aviation, their estimated operational capacity was 120–160 aircraft. The largest airfields are Bagram, Kabul (Khoja Revash), Kandahar, Herat and Shindand (Sebzevar). The airfields of Kabul and Kandahar are classified as international. All these airfields are equipped with 1-2 main runways with a width of mainly 45 m, taxiways and group concrete aircraft parking. These airfields have warehouses for various purposes, hangars, service and residential buildings. Shelters for aircraft from protective walls were built only at the Bagram airfield.

Unpaved airfields are mainly used by civil aviation. As alternate airfields for basing tactical aircraft, 6 unpaved airfields can be used - in Dehdadi, Lashkargah, Matun, Kandahar, Faizabad and Chaghcharan. Airfields with runways less than 1800 m long are used by light aircraft. The permanent deployment of the air force (Air Force) of the DRA is carried out at the most equipped airfields: Bagram, Jalalabad, Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif and Shindand. The main means of radio navigation equipment in the territory of Afghanistan are medium-wave radio beacons available at 11 airfields. The airfields of Kabul (Khoja-Revash) and Kandahar have, in addition, a short-range radio navigation system. The length of international airlines in the country is over 2 thousand km. Air transportation is carried out by one national airline, Bakhtar Afghan Airlines, which serves both domestic and international airlines.

Thus, at the time of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, there were few airfields, and with the increase in the aviation component, the question of building new airfields almost immediately arose. In the shortest possible time, several sets of metal airfield pavement from K-1D slabs were delivered to create runways and taxiways.

The engineering and airfield service of the TurkVO Air Force was able to bring the country's airfield network to mind - by the middle of 1985, seven Afghan airfields had been built or significantly re-equipped by Soviet units: Herat, Shindand, Farah, Kandahar, Kabul International Airport, Bagram and Jalalabad. The airfields at Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, Ghanzi and Pol-i-Shakri were of no strategic importance and were subject to reconstruction to a much lesser extent.

Thus, during the war in Afghanistan, eleven airfields were able to provide round-the-clock jet flights in all weather conditions, however, Jalalabad was used only by helicopter pilots.

The key bases for basing Soviet aviation were the bases in Bagram (there was based the largest number Soviet planes and helicopters) and Shindande (here, among other things, aircraft were repaired and maintained). From these airfields, mainly Su-25 attack aircraft and MiG-23 fighters made sorties.

At the base airfields of Soviet aviation, radio navigation and communication facilities were additionally installed, joint command posts were created for flight control, combat operations control, as well as air traffic of Soviet and Afghan aviation over the territory of Afghanistan.

Soviet air units, together with Afghan ones, were based at four airfields (Kabul, Bagram, Shindand and Kandahar), and four more airfields were based separately on Soviet (Kunduz, Faizabad and Jalalabad) and Afghan (Mazar-i-Sharif) units.

During the regrouping of aviation in the interests of the upcoming operations, Soviet and Afghan aircraft and helicopters were jointly based at almost all available airfields. To strengthen the security and defense of airfields, one motorized rifle (less often, parachute) battalion was allocated to each of them.

The total staffing of the Soviet aviation group in Afghanistan (Air Force of the 40th Army) initially included two aviation regiments and one separate squadron, one mixed aviation and three separate helicopter regiments, three separate helicopter squadrons and one helicopter detachment. A total of 60 combat aircraft and 19 military transport aircraft, 253 combat and transport-combat helicopters. Taking into account the physical and geographical conditions and the deployment of combined arms formations and individual units of the 40th Army and the areas of combat operations assigned to them, the aviation group in Afghanistan (Air Force 40th A) was divided into four groups: “North”, “Center”, “ South" and "West".

Combat strength of the Air Force of the 40th Army as of 2.01.1980

Sometimes, during major operations, individual aviation subunits from the named groups were involved in operations in other areas, however, when planning military operations, they tried to avoid this because of the difficulties of regrouping aviation. "Worked" in the sky of Afghanistan reconnaissance aircraft, bombers from the Long-Range Aviation. Afghan airfields also visited a lot of ambulance aircraft, for which, according to the mobilization plan, Il-18s from the Ural air squadrons of the civil air fleet were converted.

With the relocation of fighters and fighter-bombers to Afghanistan at the airfields of Bagram (115th Guards IAP), Kandahar (136th Apib) and Shindand (217th Apib, then a squadron of the 136th), combat duty of Soviet aircraft was introduced in the general system Air defense of Afghanistan.

Already with the entry of troops into Afghanistan, Soviet aviation suffered its first loss - on December 25, 1979, an Il-76 crashed with paratroopers on board.

Flying as part of a trio of Il-76M from the 128th Guards Vtap (commander - Captain V.V. Gol Ovchin), while building a landing approach at Kabul airport, he collided with a mountain. The black box could not be found, because the plane crashed high in the mountains in a hard-to-reach place. Rather, the cockpit with the crew turned out to be on the other side of the ridge, where it was still possible to somehow get to, and the remains of the pilots, with great difficulty, but got it. And the salon, where there were 34 paratroopers and equipment, fell into an inaccessible gorge, and only in September 2006 they were found.

Immediately after the plane crashed, the military tried to get to the crash site. The surviving records of the search and rescue work tell how difficult it was:

“December 26, 1979. While performing a landing maneuver, an Il-76 aircraft crashed with the crew, paratroopers and equipment on board. He crashed into one of the peaks surrounding the Kabul airfield. As a result, 7 crew members and 34 paratroopers were killed.

12/27/1979. In the morning, Major General Egorov A.A. flew on a Mi-8 helicopter to the alleged area of ​​the crash, but the exact crash site was not found due to heavy snowfall.

12/28/1979. The head of the operational group of military transport aviation called a group of CSKA climbers who were training camps in the Tien Shan. For them, this was a complete surprise, and they very much regretted that they did not have with them a helicopter providing them, the crew of which was trained for landing and rescue work in the mountains. All climbers in bright down jackets stand out noticeably among the gray-green mass of troops.

12/30/1979. 8 climbers, 2 aviation engineers and 5 paratroopers were landed on the mountain. There is an agreement with the hospital to transport the bodies that died in a plane crash to the morgue.

At 16.00, the Mi-8 helicopter found the mountain ridge at the site of the Il-76 strike, one part of the aircraft on one side, the other on the other side of the ridge. The most interesting parts are located on the opposite side of the slope on which the climbers' tent is set.

01/01/1980. At 10.30 the climbers found the cockpit of the Il-76 with the remains of the body of Shishov, the assistant commander of the ship…”

Yervand Ilyinsky, leader of the group of climbers, shared interesting details about these tragic events in his interview with journalists of the BBC Russian Service: “Once, at the end of December 1979, a phone rang in my apartment in Alma-Ata.

They called from Moscow. The conversation was short - they said that they urgently needed to fly to Dushanbe, for some kind of rescue work at an altitude of up to six thousand meters, the fourth category of complexity. I was told to gather a group and take singles there.<…>At that time, no one knew about the upcoming war - the Soviet leadership announced the introduction of troops into Afghanistan only the next day.

When landing, we stuck our faces to the windows. The runway was completely surrounded by Soviet military tents, and BMDs, airborne combat vehicles, stood right along the perimeter.

We were surprised, but took such a concentration of Soviet troops in Afghanistan simply for some kind of exercise.<…>On the morning of December 27, we were finally told about the upcoming operation, about the plane that had crashed in the mountains, the dead paratroopers and the briefcase with documentation.<…>

After that we went to the foothills of the Hindu Kush. The road went through numerous villages, and I got the strange impression that war was war, and dinner was lunch - somewhere someone fought, and in the villages life went on as usual.

Later, we transferred to a helicopter, which took us directly to the crash site, which was at an altitude of 4200 meters. The snow was very deep, the helicopter could not land and hung in the air, and we jumped down from two or three meters.

We were ordered to search for the bodies of the dead and collect their documents, which we did for several days. There were not bodies, but fragments of bodies - after all, the plane crashed into a rock at a speed of about 500 km / h. In addition, shells were scattered around - we walked, as if through a minefield. There, in the snow, among mines and human remains, we met the new year, 1980.

On the morning of January 1, one of our men found a black leather briefcase and handed it over to the authorities. After that, the work began to curtail.

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The above introductory fragment of the book Dangerous Skies of Afghanistan. Experience in the combat use of Soviet aviation in a local war. 1979–1989 (M. A. Zhirokhov, 2012) provided by our book partner -